Supreme Court has ordered to public lal masjid commission report and told the government to give it to anyone requesting for it. In the report the commission has put the blame of innocent loss of lives on General (R) Pervaiz Musharraf and his team at that time including former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.
There were some issues in the report which are still a subject of great like the body count and who died. Reportedly, according to the commission report some 103 people were killed in the operation including 92 civilians and 11 security personnel. They also said that no woman was killed in the operation.
However, according to several accounts from lal masjid students, prominent journalists and religious leaders, there were much casualties including women and children. Those who were killed, also allegedly included mother of Abdur Rasheed Ghazi and Abdul Aziz.
Before jumping on any conclusion, we need to take this report very carefully and in full context.
There are two parts of the issue:
a) circumstances in which the operation happened:
The commission interviewed people involved in negotiations and from establishment. based on that they put the blame on government for unnecessary loss of innocent lives. they have recommended DIYAT for the victims and also mentioned that they can go for QISAS as well.
b) ground evidence and number count of bodies and who died:
They had to rely on people sitting in ISI, MI or IB to get ground intelligence on that.
A good thing Supreme Court has done is that they have told the government to make the report public and so it will be a good chance for victim families and supporters to come forward and challenge the given figures based on possible lies of ISI, IB and MI or other govt. agencies. We need to know that most of the relevant ground evidence was destroyed by Army when they shut down the area.
ISLAMABAD: Top bosses of the NAB have simply vanished to respond to the media queries pertaining to the alleged extreme coercive measures that were said to have been used during the last days on Kamran Faisal that may have led to his sudden death, either by suicide or murder.
Chairman NAB Fasih Bukhari and Director General Financial Crime Wing Kausar Malik, who are alleged to have held an insulting meeting with Kamran Faisal on the night of Jan 16, are neither responding on their mobile phones nor have replied to the SMS messages sent to them.
After repeated efforts the NAB spokesman Zafar Iqbal was, however, helpful to the extent of responding to an SMS message, conveying: “Sorry for late response. In fact I’m still with some guests. As far as you question is concerned, it is totally untrue.”
The spokesman was asked if he could confirm whether Kamran Faisal was brought to Chairman’s office by Kausar Malik where the officer was alleged to have been pressurised to change his report in favour of the prime minister in the RPPs case.
A NAB official, speaking on the condition of full confidentiality, confided to The News that Kamran Faisal was under extreme duress to change his investigation report that had become the basis for the SC’s recent order to get Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf and over 20 others arrested in the RPPs case.
The source said that in the evening of Jan 16 Kamran Faisal, who was an assistant director of NAB Rawalpindi, was sitting with his colleagues in the office of Rawalpindi NAB Additional Director Staff officer Shafqat, when he received a phone call from NAB Islamabad headquarter to rush there. Besides others, it is said, assistant director Shahzad was also present.
It is said that the phone call from the Bureau’s headquarter had come from Director General Financial Crime Wing Kausar Malik. After the phone call, Kamran is said to have shared with his colleagues that he was being summoned to Islamabad HQs. On this the NAB Rawalpindi additional director staff officer provided to Kamran the official vehicle Kia Registration No. 4242 to attend this urgently called meeting in Islamabad. The name of the vehicle’s driver was said to be Tariq.
When approached by The News Shafqat refused to discuss anything regarding this mysterious death. However, the source claimed that Kamran reached NAB’s headquarters and went to Kausar Malik’s office where he was told that he should change his report for the sake of the institution’s respect as on the next day (Jan 17) the Supreme Court was to hear the PM’s arrest case.
The source added that Kamran was reluctant to change his report on the wishes of his superior. Later, it is said, Kausar Malik took him to the office of Chairman NAB Fasih Bukhari who was also accompanied by one of the key prosecutors of the Bureau.
In the Chairman NAB’s office, the source said, all the three again pressed him to change his report and suggested to him that he could give the reason that for being upset he had wrongly included the name of Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf in the RPPs corruption case. It is said that he was also asked to sign a blank stamp paper.
The source claimed that after his refusal he was asked to leave. Kamran later got back to Kausar Malik’s office and shared with some of his Rawalpindi colleagues what had happened to him. On Jan 17 hearing of the RPPs case, it is said that Kamran was also present in the SC.
Fasih Bukhari was contacted several times but he did not pick up his mobile. Bukhari also did not respond to The News query forwarded to him through SMS mobile message.
Kausar Malik also did not respond to The News. An SMS message sent to him on Friday evening was responded in the midnight conveying that his mobile phone battery got exhausted so “just saw” the message. He promised to coordinate with The News on Saturday but it did not happen despite repeated efforts. Kausar Malik even did not bother to respond to the questions sent to him.
These questions included: a) Will you please explain why did you call Kamran to your office on 16th evening? B) Why did you take him to the Chairman NAB? c) Did you and the chairman pressurise him to change his report?
Meanwhile an unidentified caller from an official number starting with 924 figure had called this correspondent on Friday evening claiming that late on the evening of Jan 17 Kamran was badly scolded by his senior in the Rawalpindi NAB office for refusing to change his investigation report. The caller claimed to be a young officer of the NAB. However, this fact has also not been officially confirmed.
PAKISTAN: Army officers acknowledged that a disappeared person was in their custody but the courts failed to recover him –>AHRC
Issue of missing persons needs to be resolved as early as possible otherwise this will lead to our society like it used to be in Nazi Germany where life was made impossible for opposing voices. If someone has done some crime then there are courts and constitution to judge not military kidnappers who themselves have a hisotry of constitutional violations and betrayals with the country. Extra-judicial killings and illegal abductions will not serve any good cause.
Below is a report from Asian Human Rights Commission and it leaves some serious concerns in any mind with some sense of justice and humanity.
Human history has taught us a very good lesson which is often used as a slogan :
No Justice No Peace !
PAKISTAN: Army officers acknowledged that a disappeared person was in their custody but the courts failed to recover him–>AHRC
The case of the disappearance of a master tailor exposes how the army is involved and the weaknesses of the judicial system
The Asian Human Rights Commission has received the details of the saga of disappearance of a master tailor who was arrested on two occasions by army personnel and how since October 2001 his whereabouts are unknown. The high officials of the Pakistan army including Corps Commander of Balochistan province, a major general, the governor of the province and above all of them, the chief of the Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI) had confessed on the holy Quran in 2003 that the victim was in the custody of the ISI and that he would be released after the investigation.
The Judicial Commission to probe the cases of missing persons has also submitted a report to the Supreme Court of Pakistan that Mr. Bangulzai, the master tailor, was in the custody of secret services of Pakistan.
The dilemma is that since 2001 to date, the higher courts, the governments of the federation and Balochistan have failed to recover him because of the involvement of the army and its intelligence agencies in his disappearance.
Mr. Ali Asghar Bangulzai 50, the son of Ghulam Nabi was arrested the first time by secret services on June 1, 2000 from his tailoring shop. After 14 days he was released. After his release it was found that he had lost his memory because of the severe torture he had endured. He could not even recognise his own house where he was born. After his recovery he revealed to his family that he was kept in a torture cell at the basement of army’s Kulli camp situated at Quetta cantonment. During his confinement he was kept blindfolded at all times; his hands were cuffed and he was frequently suspended by the wrists by officials of ISI. This is according to his family members from he later told them. After his release for almost one year he was not able to run his tailoring shop.
Mr. Bangulzai was the resident of Chaki Shahwani, Sariab Road, Quetta, capital of Balochistan province. His tailor shop was in walking distance from his home. The army was suspicious that many people were visiting his shop and that he must be involved in militant activities.
Again, on October 18, 2001 Bangulzai was arrested along with his friend Mohammad Iqbal by men who came in army vehicles. Iqbal was released after 22 days he told Bangulzai’s family members that he was in an army torture cell. The family tried to contact the local officials and army command office for his whereabouts but they refused to meet the family. In early 2002, a constitutional petition was filed in the Balochistan high court, during hearing Mr. Iqbal recorded his statement that Bangulzai was in Kulli Army camp. He also took part in a press conference in Quetta Press Club with Bangulzai family members with regard to his arrest .The family members also submitted an application to SHO (Station head officer) Sariab Police Station with a request to lodge an FIR (First information report) about his illegal arrest and disappearance but the police refused to file the FIR because of the involvement of military intelligence agencies. The family of the victim also filed an application before the High Court to order police to file the FIR but the court could not help the family.
On April 27, 2002 family members of Bangulzai met the then Major General Abdul Qadir Baloch , who was Corp Commander of the province to inquire about the whereabouts of the Bagulzai. The family was given assurance that they would be informed about his whereabouts. The Corps Commander sent two officers from military intelligence to the house of victim on May 15, 2002 who told the family that Bangulzai was safe and in the custody of the ISI. As the interrogation is completed he would be released but officials refused to allow the family members to meet him.
In the meantime the family members in desperation tried to meet members of the parliament. They were able to meet Mr. Hafiz Hussain Ahmad MNA (Member of National Assembly) who took the family members to meet with the head of ISI (Inter services intelligence) Baluchistan, Brigadier Siddique. During the meeting Brigadier called Colonel Bangush and asked him to bring the file of Bangulzai. After seeing the file Brigadier Siddique congratulated the family and said that Banguzai was in their custody. During different meetings the family members of Bangulzai insisted that they wanted to meet with him but every time they were told that there was no need as he would be released soon.
On October 4, 2003 Brigadier Siddique asked the family members of the victim to provide clothes for him because all arrangements had been made for his release.
For the whole one year family members waited for his release and then they adopted the peaceful protest. Bangulzai’s children left their studies and went on a token hunger strike camp in front of Quetta Press Club for the safe recovery of their father and to record their peaceful protest. The camp was there for one year.
On July 14, 2005 the Baluchistan High Court on the pressure from lawyers and civil society took suo motto notice and directed the Superintendent of Police (SP) of Chilton Town, Mr. Wazeer khan, to investigate and register an FIR for Bangulzai’s disappearance by the state intelligence agencies. During the hearing seven persons recorded their statements that army personnel had arrested him and that had assured them many times he would be released from army custody. As usual on the pressure from army Sariab Police Station Quetta refused to register the FIR.
On March 2006 Hafiz Hussain Ahmad, the member of national assembly, visited the token hunger strike camp of family members of Bangulzai and told the local news papers representatives that the head of ISI (Inter services intelligence) Brigadier Siddique has himself acknowledge before him that Bangulzai is in their custody and also assured him that he will be released soon. Hafiz deplored the attitude of ISI officers for lying and misguiding the people.
On February 2007 the family members of Bangulzai submitted a petition in Supreme Court of Pakistan, in which Hafiz Hussain Ahmad’s written statement was submitted in the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
In continuation of their efforts the family members filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan in February 2007 where Mr. Hafiz Hussain Ahmad, the MNA, has submitted his written statement that ISI had assured him several times that Bangulzai is in their custody. The Supreme Court then ordered on January 31, 2010 that the FIR of his disappearance should be filed. The court also directed the police to file the FIRs of other disappeared persons also.
The Joint Investigation Team to probe the cases of disappeared persons, formed by the government of Pakistan, has also submitted a report to the Supreme Court that according to the testimonies of the eye witnesses and other supportive statements Bangulzai was in the custody of state intelligence agencies.
A Judicial commission to probe the cases of the missing persons, formed by the Federal Government on the instruction from Supreme Court has also came to the conclusion in the March 2010 that after recording all the witnesses that Bangulzai was arrested by the Pakistan secret services and that he was in its custody. The report was duly submitted to the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
During the hearing of the Judicial Commission, Mr.Hafiz Hussain Ahmad (MNA) has recorded his statement that the Brigadier Siddique, head of the ISI in Balochistan province, has acknowledge to him that Bangulzai was in their custody and soon he would be released. Mohammad Iqbal who was arrested with Bangulzai also recorded his statement that they were arrested by secret services and that Bangulzai was in their custody. The other witnesses as well recorded their statements that Brigadier has several times accepted in front of them, and Corps commander Qadir Baloch sent his two (MI) (Military intelligence) personnel to the victim’s family and said that he was in the custody of an Intelligence Agency.
It is appalling that 11 years after his arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention by the intelligence agencies Bangulzai’s whereabouts are still unknown. None of the institutions and officials who were involved in his disappearance has been put on trial despite the fact that they have admitted his detention 11 years ago! Judges hearing disappearances cases have stated in court that any intelligence officer involved in the disappearance of an individual should be placed on trial but this has never happened. Not one has ever been punished.
In the presence of all the evidence that he was illegally arrested and kept incommunicado in an army torture cell by the ISI, the weakness of the country’s justice system is blatantly evident before the powerful military and security agencies. His disappearance by the military is contravention of the basic rights guaranteed by the constitution of Pakistan for example:
Article 4 — The right of individuals to be dealt with by law, Article 10–safe guards as to arrest and detention — the arrested person should be produced within 24 of his arrest before the magistrate, Article 14 — no person should be tortured, Article 15 — freedom of movement and Article 25- all citizens are equal before the law.
The case of Bangulzai is a clear demonstration that the laws of the country do not apply to the military and intelligence agencies. When it comes to providing justice to the ordinary citizen in the face of these institutions the judiciary remains silent.
The Asian Human Rights Commission urges that Mr. Bangulzai should be released immediately from the captivity by the army and its intelligence agencies and that the officials responsible for this arrest and disappearance are prosecuted. Furthermore, the compensation must be paid to his family for the ordeal suffered by him and his family members.
Another 16 December is here and I don’t think much lessons are learned from a disaster which could have made any nation with some conscience to think over its strategies. Still our military establishment is involved in dirty politics, working for imperialist agenda and busy in securing their business agenda. Our establishment and politicians have not learned much lessons and are still busy in following unjust practices, suppression and killing of own people to please their masters and fulfil their greed.
“Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.” — Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on 1971
Recommendations below are taken from the Supplementary report issued by Hamood ur Rehman Commission which was setup to investigate the events in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
There are parts which are missing as the report is never officially released and it was published by some indian media.
Full Supplementary Report can be downloaded from here :
In the concluding portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had made a number of
recommendations based on our study of the various aspects of the causes of the debacle of
1971. Some of these recommendations need to be modified, or amplified, in the light of the fresh
evidence, which we have now recorded: while the need for the others has only been further
emphasised, we believe that the object of setting up this Commission would be fully realised
only if appropriate and early action is taken by the Government on these recommendations.2.
consider that it would be appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally set out at one
place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed reasons and justification for these
recommendations will be found in the relevant Chapters of the Main Report as well as this
Supplementary Report. We are aware that some of these recommendations have already been
implemented, but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this final
Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the
Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional
incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their duties and
physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and
resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation’s
demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future
recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war. We accordingly
recommend that the following trials be undertaken without delay.
(I) That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen.
Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a
criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if
necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to
influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both
for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading
some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to
attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of
March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East
Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and
subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of
(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (I) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in
the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect would
be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war
(iii) That Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, former Commander 1 Corps, be tried for criminal and
wilful neglect of duty in conducting the operations of his Corps in such a manner that nearly 500
villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan were surrendered to the
enemy without a light and as a consequence the Army offensive in the south was seriously
(iv) That Maj Gen Abid Zahid, former GOC 15 Div, be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful
surrender of a large area comprising nearly 98 villages in the phuklian salient in the Sialkot
district of West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat to the safety of Marala
Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within nearly 1500 yards thereof. He also kept the GHQ
in the dark about Indian occupation of the Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after
(v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC 18 Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that
his offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area
(Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in
severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert.
(vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, former Commander, Eastern Command, be court-martialled on
15 charges as set out in Chapter III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful
neglect in the performance of his professional and military duties connected with the defence of
East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces to the Indians at a juncture when he still
had the capability and resources to offer resistance.
(vii) That Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by
court martial on five charges listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the Supplementary
Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the defence of Dacca and
showing complete Jack of courage and will to fight, in acquiescing in the decision of the
Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to
put up resistance for a period of two weeks or so, and also for wilfully neglecting to inform the
authorities concerned, on repatriation to Pakistan, about the fact of distribution of Rs.50,000 by
him out of Pakistan currency notes and toher funds at his disposal or under his control in East
(viii) That Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East
Pakistan, be tried by court martial on five charges listed against him in this Report for showing
undue regard for his personal safety in abandoning his Division, his Divisional troops and area of
responsibility and Vacating his Divisional Headquarters from Chandpur on the 8th of December,
1971; for his wilful insistence on moving by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing
the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to himself
and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for his abandoning valuable signal
equipment at Chandpur; for spreading despondency and alarm by certain conversation on the
12th of December, 1971, at Dacca; and for wilfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report to
GHQ on being specially evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as to conceal the
circumstances of his desertion from him Divisional Headquarters at Chandpur.
(ix) That Brig. G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, former GOS, Eastern Command, Dacca, be tried by court
martial on nine charges as formulated in this Report, for his wilful neglect of duty in advising the
Commander, Eastern Command, as regards the concept and formulation of defence plans,
appreciation of the Indian threat, execution of denial plans, abrupt changes in command,
friendliness with he Indian during captivity and attempts to influence formation Commanders by
threats and inducements to present a co-ordinated story before the GHQ and the Commission
of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East Pakistan.
(x) That Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Commander 107 Brigade, 9 Division, East Pakistan, be
tried by court martial on four charges for displaying wilful neglect in not formulating a sound plan
for the defence of the fortress of Jesore; for failing to properly plan and command the brigade
counter-attack at Gharibpur, for shamefully abandoning the fortress of Jessor and delivering
intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps; and disobeying the orders of the GOC
9 Divison, to withdraw to Magura in the event of a forced withdrawal from Jessore;
(xi) That Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi, former commander 53 Brigade, 39 (ad-hoc) Division,
East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on six charges for displaying culpable lack of initiative,
determination and planning ability in that he failed to occupy and prepare defences at
Mudafarganj as ordered by his GOC on the 4th of December, 1971; for failing to eject the enemy
from Mudafarganj as ordered on the 6th of December, 1971; for shamefully abandoning the
fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December, 1971; for wilful neglect in failing to
properly organise oxfiltration of his troops from the fortress of Laksham to Comilla on the 9th of
December, 1971, thus resulting in heavy casualties and capture of several elements of his
troops on the way; for showing callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksham
124 sick and wounded with two Medical Officers without informing them about the proposed
vacation of the fortress; and for abandoning intact at Laksham all heavy weapons, stocks of
ammunition and supplies for the use of the enemy;
II. Inquiry and Trials for Alleged AtrocitiesThat as recommended in Paragraph 7 of Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report and in
Paragraph 39 of Chapter II of Part V of this Supplementary Report, a high-powered Court or
Commission of Inquiry be set up to investigate into persistent allegations of atrocities said to
have been committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan during its operations from March
to December, 1971, and to hold trials of those who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad
name to the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies of the local population by their acts of
wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people. The composition of the Court of Inquiry,
if not its proceedings, should be publicly announced so as to satisfy national conscience and
international opinion. The Commission feels that sufficient evidence is now available in Pakistan
for a fruitful inquiry to be undertaken in this regard. As the Government of Bangladesh has since
been recognised by Pakistan, it may also be feasible to request the Dacca authorities to
forward to this Court of Inquiry whatever evidence may be available with them.
III. Other Inquiries(I) That allegations of personal immorality, drunkenness and indulgence in corrupt practices
against General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan and Maj. Gen Khuda Dad Khan be
properly investigated as there is prima facie evidence to show that their moral degeneration
resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence. In the light of the result of this
inquiry suitable charges may be added against these Officers, during the trials we have already
recommended earlier. The details of the allegations and the evidence relating thereto will be
found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report.
(ii) That similar allegations of personal immorality, acquiring a notorious reputation in this behalf
at Sialkot, Lahore and Dacca, and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan from East to West
Pakistan made against Lt. Gen Niazi should also be inquired into and, if necessary, made the
subject matter of additional charges at the trial earlier recommended in respect of the
performance of his professional duties in East Pakistan. The details of these allegations and
the evidence relating thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report and in
Chapter I of part V of this supplementary Report.
(iii) That an inquiry is also indicated into the disposal of Rs.50, 000 said to have been distributed
by Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division and Director General,
East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces immediately before the surrender on the 16th of December
1971. Details of this matter including the General’s explanation would be found in Paras 21 to
23 of Chapter I of Part V of the Supplementary Report. We have already recommended that this
Officer be tried by a court martial on several charges including his wilful failure to disclose any
facts at all about his sum Rs.50,000. That charge does not necessarily imply any dishonest
practice on his part. The inquiry now suggested can form a part of the charges already
(iv) That allegations of indulging in large-scale looting of property in East Pakistan including theft
of Rs.1, 35,00,000 from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Ganj persistently made against
Brig. Jehanazeb Arbab, former Commander 57 Brigade, Lt Col (now Brig) Muzaffar Ali Zahid,
former CO 31 Field Regiment, Lt. Col Basharat Ahmad, former CO 18 Punjab, Lt. Col
Mohammad Taj, former CO 32 Punjab, Lt Col Mohammad Tufail, former CO 55 Field Regiment
and Major Madad Hussain Shah of 18 Punjab, as set out in Paras 24 and 25 of Chapter I of part
V of the Supplementary Report, should be thoroughly inquired into and suitable action taken in
the light of the proved facts.
(v) That an inquiry be held into the allegation, noticed by us in Para 36 of Chapter 1 of Part V of
the Main Report, that while serving in the Martial Law Administration at Multan, Maj. Gen.
Jahanzeb, presumably a Brigadier at that time, demanded a bribe of Rs. one lac from a PCS
Officer posted as Chairman of the Municipal Committee of Multan, on pain of proceeding against
him for corruption under martial Law, as a consequence of which demand the said PCS Officer
is said to have committed suicide leaving behind a letter saying that although he had made only
Rs.15,000 he was being required to pay Rs. one lac to the Martial Law officers. The allegation
was made before the Commission by Brig. Mohammad Abbas Beg (Witness No.9)
(vi) That in inquiry is also necessary into the allegation made against Brig. Hayatullah that he
entertained some wom en in his bunker in the Maqbulpur sector (West Pakistan) on the night of
the 11th or 12th of December, 1971, when Indian shells were falling on his troops. The
allegation was contained in an anonymous letter addressed to the Commission and supported
in evidence before us by the Brigadier Hayatullah’s brigade, Major, namely, Major Munawar
Khan (Witness No.42).
(vii) That it is necessary to investigate into the allegations, as set out in Paragraphs 9 to 14 of
Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report, to the effect that senior Army Commanders grossly
abused their official position and powers under the Martial Law to acquire large allotments of
land, and obtained substantial house buildings loans on extremely generous terms from certain
banking institutions with which they deposited large amounts from departmental funds entrusted
to their care. Those found guilty of corrupt practices should receive the punishment they
deserve under the military law or the ordinary criminal law of the land as the case may be.
(viii) That a thorough investigation be conducted into the suspicion created in the mind of the
Commission, during the recording of additional evidence of Officers repatriated form India, that
there may be some complicity or collusion between the Commander, Easter Command (Lt Gen
A.A.K. Niazi) and his Chief of Staff (Brig G.M. Baqir Saddiqui) on the one hand and the Indian
authorities on the other in the matter of the failure of the Pakistan Armed Forces to carry out
execution of denial plans immediately before the surrender inspite of instructions issued in this
behalf by GHQ on the 10th of December, 1971. We have already included relevant charges in
this behalf against these two Officers, but we consider that it would be in the public interest to
depute a specialized agency to probe into the matter further. On the material available to us we
cannot put the matter higher than suspicion, but we have not been able to find any reasonable,
or even plausible explanation for the orders issued by the Easter Command to stop the
execution of denial plans, particularly in Dacc and Chittagong, thus ensuring the delivery intact
to the Indians of large amounts of war materials and other equipment. Details of these deliveries
will be found in our Chapter VII of Part IV dealing with the aftermath of surrender.
(ix) That an inquiry be held into the circumstances under which Commander Gul Zareen of the
Pakistan Navy was carried from Khulna to Singapore on the 7th of December, 1971, by a
French ship called M.V. Fortescue, thus abandoning his duties at PNS Titumir Naval Base,
Khulna. The case of this Officer was dealt with by us in Paras 12 and 13 of Chapter III of Part V
of the Main Report.
IV. Cases Requiring Departmental ActionWhile examining the course of events and the conduct of war in East Pakistan, we formed a
poor opinion about the performance and capabilities of Brig. S.A.Ansari, ex-Commander 23
Brigade, Brig. Manzoor Ahmad, ex -Commander 57 Brigade, 9 Division, and Brig Abdul Qadir
Khan, ex -Commander 94 brigade, 36 (ad hoc) Division. We consider that their further retention
in service is not in the public interest and they may accordingly be retired.
V. Performance and Conduct of Junior OfficersIn the very nature of things the Commission was not in a position to examine at any length
the conduct and performance of officers below the brigade level, although some case
necessarily came to our notice where the performance of these Officers had a direct bearing on
the fate of important battles or where their conduct transgressed the norms of discipline. Such
cases have been mentioned by us at their proper place, but by and large cases of junior Officers
must be dealt with by the respective service headquarters who have obtained detailed debriefing
reports from all of them and are also in possession of the assessment of their performance by
their immediate superiors.
VI. Measures for Moral Reform in the Armed ForcesWhile dealing at some length with the moral aspect of the 1971 debacle, in Chapter I of Part
V of the Main Report as well as in the corresponding Chapter of the present Supplementary
Report, we have expressed the opinion that there is indeed substance in the widespread
allegation, rather belief, that due to corruption arising out of the performance of Martial Law
duties, lust for wine and women, and greed for lands and houses a large number of senior Army
Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but
also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded
of them for the successful prosecution of the war. Accordingly, we recommend that: –
(I) The Government should call upon all Officers of the Armed Forces to submit declarations of
their assets, both moveable and immovable, and those acquired in the names of their relations
and dependents during the last ten years (they were exempted from submitting such
declarations during the last two periods of martial Law). If on examination of such declarations
any Officer is found to have acquired assets beyond this known means, then appropriate action
should be taken against him
(ii) The Armed Services should devise ways and means to ensure: –
(a) That moral values are not allowed to be compromised by infamous behaviour particularly at
(b) That moral rectitude is given due weight along with professional qualities in the matter of
promotion to higher ranks;
(c) That syllabi of academic studies at the military academics and other Service Institutions
should include courses designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious
democratic and political institutions
(d) That use of alcoholic drinks should be banned in military messes and functions
(e) That serious notice should be taken of notorious sexual behaviour and other corrupt
VII. Discipline and Terms and Conditions of Service9.
reasons given therein we make the following recommendations: –
(I) An inter-services study should be undertaken of the operative terms and conditions of service
and amenities available to Officers, JCOs and other ranks of the Services so as to remove
disparities existing in this behalf and causing discontentment among the junior officers and
other ranks of various Services
(ii) The GHQ should consider the advisability of adopting recommendations contained in the
report submitted by the Discipline Committee headed by the late Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan Janjua
(iii) Th e Navy and Air Force might also appoint their own Discipline Committees to consider the
peculiar problems of their Services, such measure to be in addition to the inter-services study
VIII. Improvement and Modernizations of the Pakistan Navy10.
VIII of Part IV of the Main Report, and supplemented by further details of its operations in East
Pakistan is set out in this Supplementary Report, it seems to us that the following steps are
urgently called for to improve our naval capability: –
(I) That immediate attention should be given to he basic requirements for the modernizations of
the Pakistan Navy in order to make it capable of protecting the only sea port of Pakistan and of
keeping the life-lines of the nation open. The Navy has been sadly neglected ever since the first
Martial Law regime, for in the concept of Army Commander the Navy was not expected to play
much of a role. The folly of this theory was fully demonstrated during this war. The Pakistan
Navy, we strongly recommend, should have its own air arm of suitable aircraft for the purpose of
reconnaissance and for defence against missile boats. This is the only way in which the threat
posed by the growing Indian Navy and her missible boats can be countered.
(ii) There is urgent need for developing a separate harbour for the Navy away from Karachi, from
where the Navy can protect the approaches to Karachi more effectively
(iii) In view of the serious handicaps which were posed by the late conveyance of the D-day and
the H-hour to the Pakistan Navy and its total exclusion from he planning for war, the need for
making the Navy a fully operative member in he joint Chiefs of Staff Organization is imperative.
IX. Improvement in the Role of P.A.F.11. In Section (C) of Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report as well as in a separate Chapter
of the present supplement (viz Chapter X of Part III), we have discussed at length the role and
performance of the P.A.F. in the 1971 war. In the light of that discussion, we recommend as
(I) We are not convinced that a more forward-looking posture cannot be adopted by eh Air Force
having regard to the peculiar needs of the country. We recommend, therefore, that Pakistan
should have more forward air fields located at such places from where it might be in a position to
give more protection to our vital line of communication as well as to major centres of industry.
The adoption of such a fo rward strategy would also increase the striking capabilities of our
(ii) There is need also to improve the working of our early warning system. The time lag
between the observation of an enemy aircraft by the first line of Mobile Observer Units and the
final collation of that information in the Air Operation Centre takes unduly long because of the
draftory system of reporting adopted. Training exercises to coordinate the working of the various
agencies employed for the operation of the early warning system should be held periodically to
keep them at a high pitch of efficiency.
(iii) The Karachi Port should also be provided as soon as possible, with a low level seawardlooking
radar which it seriously lacks and due to the want of which it suffered many handicaps
during the last war.
(iv) That with the increased Indian capability of blockading Karachi with missile boats the air
defence of Karachi should be attached greater importance. Leaving the defence of Karachi to be
tackled only by one squadron of fighters and a half squadron of bombers was extremely unwise.
X. Re-organization of Air Defence of Pakistan12. The subject of air defence has been discussed by us at some length in section (13) of
Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report. In the light of that discussion, we make the following
(a) Since it will not be possible for us to enlarge our Air Force to any appreciable extent in the
near future, we strongly recommend that we should strengthen our air defence programmes by
at least doubling our holdings of anti-craft guns by the end of 1972 and ultimately raising it under
a phased programme to 342 Batteries as suggested by the Air Force.
(b) Efforts should also be made to procure ground to air missiles for a more effective air defence
of the country.
(c) If ground-to-air missiles are not available, then efforts should also be made to get radar
controlled medium HAA guns from China.
XI. Recommendations with Regard to Civil Defence Measures13.
consider that the following measures are called for to improve the civil defence aspects in
(a) The civil defence arrangements should be placed under the Ministry of Defence, and not be
made the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior or other individual departments. The Central
Government should accept the responsibility for the overall control and organization of the civil
defence of the country, as Provincial Governments have not been able to shoulder this
responsibility effectively in the past.
(b) Steps should be taken to improve the fire-fighting facilities in the country, particularly in ports
and industrial areas.
(c) Industrialists keeping inflammable materials near lines of communications and other
vulnerable points should be induce, or in fact obliged under the law, to accept responsibility for
the protection of their materials, and make effective arrangements for fire-fighting in their
(d) Provision should be made for storing large quantitative of petrol and other fuels underground.
XII. Higher Direction of War14.
Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main Report, and in the light of that discussion, we proposed the
following measures: –
(a) The three Service Headquarters should be located at one place along with the Ministry of
(b) The posts of Commander-in-Chiefs should be replaced by Chiefs of Staff of the respective
services (This, we understand, has already been done by the Government)/
(c) The Defence Committee of the Cabinet should be re-activated and it should be ensured that
its meetings are held regularly. A positive direction should be added in its Charter to give the
Cabinet Division the right to initiate proceedings for the convening of its meetings should be held
even in the absence of the President or the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of the senior
most minister present.
(d) There should also be a Defence Ministers Committee and the Ministry of Defence should
assume its rightful position as a policy-making body and incorporating policy, decisions into
defence programmes after consultations with the three services. This should ensure the
preparations of realistic plans for the national defence with in the agreed framework of …….
allocations. It should meet under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister and comprise the
Defence Secretary, the three service chiefs, the financial advi ser for defence, the Director
General of Civil Defence, the Director General of munitions production, the Director General of
Defence Procurement, the Director General of inter-services Intelligence Directorate, the
Defence Scientific Adviser and any other Central Secretary or Service officer who may be
required for a particular item on agenda. If the defence portfolio is held by the President or the
Prime Minister then its meeting may be presided over by a Deputy Minister for or by the
Minister in charge of Defence Production (illegible) Minister is available, the Defence Secretary
should preside, irrespective of any considerations of protocol or (illegible)
(e) The Secretaries Coordination Committee as at present constituted, should continue
(f) (illegible) The three services should share (illegible) joint responsibility for national defence
and that all plans and programmes for the development of the (illegible) forces should be based
on joint (illegible) objectives, it is necessary. Therefore, that the three services Chief should
(illegible) As Joint Chiefs of Staff and not merely as individual Heads of their respective Services.
This Joint Chiefs or Staff should constitute a corporate body with collective responsibility having
its own (illegible) staff for evolving joint plans and its own Headquarters located on one place.
The (illegible) of chairman of this Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held by rotation, irrespective of the
personal ranks enjoyed by the three service chiefs. The duration of the tenure should be one
year at a time and the chairmanship should commence with the (illegible) Service, mainly, the
Army. A detailed Chapter of duties for this Joint Chiefs of Staff has been suggested in Annexure
‘I’ of Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main report.
(g) Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organisation there will not only by a Secretariat but also a
joint planning staff drawn from all the three Services. It might be designed as the Joint
Secretariat and Planning Staff. It will be responsible not only for providing the necessary
secretarial assistance (illegible) Also for evolving the joint defence plans and (illegible) studies
of processing of all matters of inter-(illegible) The Joint Chief of Staff may also have other Joint
Common to assist them on such matters, as it may consider necessary.
(h) The weakness, in the (illegible) of the armed forces, which have been brought by light,
(illegible) feel that there is need for an institution like the America” (illegible) General’ which
should be a body changed was the duty of carrying out surprise inspection and calling area the
formations and (illegible) concerned to demonstrate that the (illegible)
(this para not readable)
(i) We have also felt the (illegible) for in Institute of Strategic Studies, preferably as a part of a
University Programme. The need for such an (illegible) has been highlighted by the weakness in
our joint strategic panning by the three Services. We are of the opinion that such an Institute will
go a long way in producing studies of value for examination by the other defence organizations.
XIII National Security CouncilHaving examined the working of the National Security Council in Chapter XI of Part IV of the
Main Report we are of the opinion that there is no need for super-(illegible) such an organization
on the Directorate of Intelligence Bureau and the Directorate of Inter-services Intelligence. The
Security Council should therefore be abolished.
XIV. The Farman Ali incidentIn view of the fresh evidence examined by us regarding the role of Maj Gen Farman Ali,
which we have discussed in the concluding portion of Chapter III of Part V of the Supplementary
Report, recommendation No. 7 made in the Main Report has now become (illegible); as we have
found that in delivering a message to Mr. Paul Mare Henry, Assistant Secretary General of the
United Nations. Maj Gen Farman Ali, acted under the instructions of the Governor of East
Pakistan, who in turn had been authorised by the then President of Pakistan to make certain
proposals for settlement in East Pakistan at the critical juncture.
$260 billion gold mines going for a song, behind closed doors–>Special Report By Shaheen Sehbai, The News
Special Report By Shaheen Sehbai
WASHINGTON/ISLAMABAD: Quietly, and below the media radar, some 20 top corporate bosses and lobbyists of two of the world’s largest gold mining groups have been meeting President Asif Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, Governor State Bank and others in Islamabad throughout last week, pressing them to quickly hand over one of the world’s biggest gold and copper treasures found in Balochistan at Reko Diq, worth over $260 billion, to their companies, and for peanuts.
Before these highly enticing visits of the mining tycoons to clinch the deals, which followed intense behind-the-scene negotiations and bargaining through middle men, some highly bizarre developments have been taking place, leaving experts and the rest of the mining world stunned, amazed and confused.
These companies want that the mining licences should be issued by Pakistan immediately after their exploration licences expire soon. But there are legal hitches and pressure is now being put through the backdoor to get the target.
In recent years, so many games have been played to keep Pakistan’s share in the enormous treasure to a bare minimum, thanks to some greedy politicians and bureaucrats who sold their country’s natural wealth.
A deep study of numerous documents, statements of major players, stakeholders and competitors, interviews with key Pakistani officials, including Chief Minister of Balochistan Nawab Aslam Raisani, the picture that emerges is so murky and mind boggling that any ordinary soul just cannot fathom what is going on. Only a thorough and detailed judicial probe can untangle this mystery.
There is a plethora of documents, which prove that almost everybody involved is trying to deceive everybody else, the real picture is never presented, misleading statements and even contradictory claims have been made in the media, the issue has been kept confused as the real mega deal is maturing fast behind closed doors.
“Because there is no effective investigating agency like NAB operating in the country, it is just the right case for the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of Pakistan to pick up the issue, put a hold on whatever is going on before any binding contracts and deals are signed, which may cause losses of billions of dollars, yes billions of dollars to Pakistan,” according to a corporate executive involved in the mining industry, based in New York. His company chairman is a reputed former three-term Congressman.
“The Reko Diq scandal is equal to 260 steel mills valued at one billion dollar each or 570 steel mills at $350 million each, the price at which PSM was being sold by PM Shaukat Aziz before it was stopped by the Supreme Court,” shows a calculation.
And according to one Washington mining industry expert, if Pakistan gets its fair share from the gold and copper mines, Balochistan and Pakistan would become richer than any of the present oil producing Gulf countries, many times over. “They have the goods, they need the will,” he said.
The massive mine deposits at Reko Diq in Chagai Balochistan are part of the same geological belt discovered in Afghanistan, which the Pentagon recently claimed was worth one trillion dollars, though President Hamid Karzai claimed it was worth more than 3 trillion dollars.
According to a report in the New York Times on June 13, 2010 by James Risen: “The previously unknown deposits — including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium — are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world, the United States officials believe. An internal Pentagon memo, for example, states that Afghanistan could become the Saudi Arabia of lithium, a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and Black Berrys.”
Pakistan, it is estimated in mining circles, has more deposits than Afghanistan, so the enormity of the riches and the cost of the backdoor deals can easily be guessed. “It would be the mother of all the deals and grandfather of all the corruption cases in Pakistan, put together,” according to one expert.
Reading the piles of documents, statements, interviews and legal papers available with The News, the picture that emerges is one of a grand deception, loot and plunder that never happened before on such a scale and the facts, untruths, half-truths, attempts to sabotage, frauds and backdoor bribes, are all documented.
It all started in the Musharraf era but once the massive scale of the stakes involved became apparent to the PPP government, the Raisani/Zardari camp quickly jumped into the fray to renegotiate the deal, behind closed doors.
An Australian mineral exploration firm originally started the exploration and invested some $30 million but in 2006 sold the company to a Canadian and Chilean joint venture for $230 million. The old company was an Australian public company Tethyan Copper Prosperity Limited and the new company was named Tethyan Copper Company (TCC) of Pakistan. A trick game is being played in these cosmetic changes. The Canadians and Chileans, according to publicly declared information to their shareholders and regulators, took 37.5 per cent share each, while Pakistan only had the remaining 25 per cent.
Seeing the vast potential, the TCC soon raised its investment to half a billion dollars. The Pakistani shares belong to the Government of Balochistan and the federal government has no share. Due monies have not been paid to Pakistan or Balochistan treasuries.
Two licences (EL-6 and EL-8) for exploration were also given on a 100 per cent ownership basis to these foreign firms, with Pakistan (or Balochistan) having no share at all.
All this was done during the Musharraf regime and bureaucrats played havoc with Pakistani interests. They were trying to emulate President Hamid Karzai’s mining minister, who was caught with $30 million in his Dubai bank and later removed. According to a Washington Post report on Nov 18, 2009: “The Afghan minister of mines accepted a roughly $30 million bribe to award the country’s largest development project to a Chinese mining firm.”
Quoting a US official, the Washington Post said: “The alleged payment to Mohammad Ibrahim Adel was made in Dubai within a month of December 2007, when a big Chinese metallurgical group received the contract for a $2.9 billion project to extract copper from the Aynak deposit in Logar province. Aynak is considered one of the largest unexploited copper deposits in the world.”
The Pakistanis were never told the exact size of the gold and copper deposits that were found by these foreigners. Even until July this year, when a top level delegation of the Canadian company led by Aaron Regent met Prime Minister Gilani in Islamabad, the PM was told that development of this mega project shall generate a revenue of only about $3.5 billion for Government of Pakistan and $4.5 billion for Government of Balochistan over 40 years.
But the Canadian company has to report the real value to its own Canadian government agencies every year and on December 31, 2008 it informed these agencies, and its shareholders, that its 37.5 per cent share in Reko Diq would yield 17 million ounces of gold and 20 billion pounds of copper in measured, indicated and inferred resources. And these deposits have to be mined in 25 years, not as PM of Pakistan was told in 40 years.
At current prices of these two minerals, the total asset of the Canadian, Chilean and Pakistan government would be over $260 billion and according to former Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin, as the prices of gold and copper go up, the total yield could be even $500 billion or may be a trillion.
In 2008 the PPP leaders entered the equation and on Dec 25, 2009 the Government of Balochistan announced the cancellation of the Reko Diq agreement. The decision was taken unanimously by the provincial cabinet, which also means the entire Balochistan Assembly. The cabinet also decided not to extend exploration licence of Reko Diq to the Canadian company and not to issue any mining licence for further work. Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani said on the occasion: “Cancellation of the Reko Diq copper and gold project agreement is a step towards getting control over provincial resources in accordance with the wishes of the people.”
The key statement he made was that he had held consultations with the coalition partners (read PPP and President Zardari) on the matter.
Before Raisani’s decisions in 2008 and 2009, the former chief minister during the Musharraf regime, Jam Yusuf had visited Canada and Chile in early 2007, why no one knows as it can only be guessed what a CM could do in the corporate HQ of a company.
Early this year, Raisani handed over affairs of the project to the Department of Mines and Mineral Development of Balochistan and acquired the services of eminent nuclear scientist Dr Samar Mubarakmand, who was made head of its Board of Governors.
After the July 2010 visit of the Canadian company head to Islamabad, Chief Minister Raisani and Federal Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources started pressurising the federal and provincial government officials to make an early decision about Reko Diq. Lots of officials were transferred from their posts. In October, in an unprecedented letter, the CM asked President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to convene a high-level meeting to take the final decision. It seems double games were already underway.
But in Dubai, before the Canadians visited Islamabad to see President Zardari, the CEO of the company announced on October 25, 2010 that Reko Diq project would go ahead as planned despite plans by the provincial government to cancel it. “The project is going ahead and will not be cancelled, we are now in talks with the government and we expect production to start by the end of 2015,” Gerhard Von Borries, Chief Executive of TCC, said on the sidelines of an industry event in Dubai.
One month before the October visit to Islamabad, the company submitted a 100,000 pages feasibility study and gave the cost as $3.3 billion. Experts say this $3.3 billion will be the construction cost to build the mining infrastructure to extract the gold and copper. It took three years to write this report and the Samar Mubarakmand Board was expected to study and give its finding, quickly, may be in just a few days.
But before the Board of Governors headed by Dr Samar could open the report, a new committee was formed on October 1, 2010, excluding most of the board members and perhaps the new committee would now decide everything, in undue haste shortly.
The Canadian company, Barrick Gold, with 29 mines all over the world, is already being accused on the web of some strange activities. These include spills of cyanide, mercury and other heavy metals, police and legalistic repression of critics, threats to water resources on four continents and even food poisoning, as well as rape.
In 2008, under oath in the Balochistan High Court, Barrick Gold stated it had nothing to do with building an airport in the heart of Balochistan for its mining operations. It turned out the airport was actually built but on someone else’s property, a neighbouring exploration company from the US.
However, in its quarterly filings of March 2007, Barrick reported to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in Washington DC that they had spent $30 million to build the airport in Pakistan and other activities. It was the same strip built on the neighbour’s property. The company made a false statement, to either the Balochistan High Court or the SEC. It was potential perjury any way. The US company, Benway Corporation, which is also exploring in the same area, has gone to Balochistan High Court against the intrusion on its land besides reporting the case to the SEC, which is looking whether violations of the US laws on corrupt practices have been violated.
While these confusing details may not make any sense for an ordinary reader, some 1,050 documents filed in the Balochistan High Court show that the TCC has been given unlawfully 508 sq km land on 30-year leases, a fact which CM Raisani has no clue about.
On Oct 28, when TCC executives were meeting the top PPP bosses in Islamabad, Chief Minister Balochistan was also around and he told Ahmad Noorani of The News: “This is impossible. As so far issues have not been finalised, so in no way TCC could be leased such a big land and that too for 30 years”.
He was asked: “Do you know that Reko Diq Exploration Licence No 5 gives TCC 240,000 acres of land and it expires in 2011. That TCC has had this licence from the Department of Mineral and Mining Development and on December 24 2009 you declared by a unanimous cabinet decision not to renew EL 5. But actually TCC had carefully bought and leased all that land from Board of Revenue of Balochistan in 2008 for 10 million dollars for 30 years. Your December 24 decision really had no teeth. TCC owns the land for 30 years. What has changed since December 24, 2009 that you are ready to sign a new agreement within a week or by November 24, 2010?”
The chief minister, who had no idea that a 30-year lease had been granted, responded: “It is not possible that such a big chunk of land is leased to TCC for a period of 30 years.” He asked his personal secretary to recheck and confirm the exact situation of the land lease to the TCC.
He was then asked about the cheques of millions of rupees he had received from the Canadian company. “How many total cheques you received from TCC or their related companies since you were sworn in as the CM. Why he thought they were giving him checks when their case was in the process of a major decision.”
Raisani admitted that a total of two cheques were given to him for Rs 10 million and Rs 8.5 million. “Both cheques were for the chief minister’s relief fund and were deposited in the Government of Balochistan account,” he maintained.
A spokesman of the TCC in Islamabad told The News that a cheque of Rs 8.5 million was given to Chief Minister Balochistan on Aug 25, 2010 for CM’s flood relief fund only and this cheque was for chief minister. But Press Secretary to the Chief Minister, Kamran, claimed that the cheque of Rs8.5 million was given by the TCC in the name of the Government of Balochistan and was deposited in the CM’s account for flood relief. He said this cheque had nothing to do with the files of the TCC in CM’s office.
CM Raisani told The News after the Dec 24, 2009 decision that the TCC had submitted a fresh feasibility study, which was being analysed and so far no final decision had been taken. Despite the statement of his press secretary, the CM asserted that no date could be given when the decision to award this project would be taken.
Asked about the licences, which were totally foreign owned without any share of Pakistan, the CM answered that for exploration licences there was no question of any share of Government of Balochistan. “For exploration, Balochistan will have to pay the TCC,” he argued.
In answer to the most pertinent question asked about the size of the deposits and what Pakistan would get out of the deal, CM Raisani was evasive.
He was asked: “Do you know that the value of Reko Diq is $260 billion as per records of the Canadian company (at today’s gold/copper international market rates), the government and former Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin said its value was $500 billion but in July the President of Barrick Gold came to PM Gilani and said the value was only $50 billion. Why is the government in such a hurry to decide this matter in favour of TCC on the fast track?”
In a surprising statement, Raisani just said the total cost was Rs 8.9 billion, not dollars. He ignored the rest of the question. Asked whether any international consultant was being hired to study the 100,000 pages feasibility studies as this was the first project of its kind in Pakistan, the CM said: “No, we don’t. We don’t need any. We have so many experts in different fields.”
“Is it correct that CM Balochistan is being pressurised by President Zardari to sign a deal with TCC,” he was asked.
His response: “I met President Zardari on this issue on Wednesday (last week).” Asked what the president told him to do, he said it was between President Zardari and him and he would not disclose what Zardari asked him on awarding of the project to the TCC.
But then, as an after thought, he added: “The federal government is not pressurising me on this issue. We are dealing with this ourselves.”
The bottomline is that Pakistan now has to issue mining licences to extract gold and cooper, which is worth billions of dollars and the current mood in Islamabad is to give the foreign companies a huge share. In fact, Pakistan should retain 70 to 80 per cent of these treasures.
In many countries, where agreements had already been signed giving a much bigger share to foreigners, these agreements were revised in the interest of the host country. Ireland, South Africa, Venezuela renegotiated their mining and oil exploration contracts to their benefit.
Anyone interested in making a few million dollars, like the Afghan minister of the Karzai government, which could cost the country billions, must not be allowed to do so. This is the role the Supreme Court, parliament and the media have to play at this crucial time.
Note: The Islamabad portion of this Special Report including CM Raisani’s interview was filed by Ahmad Noorani.
Comments : Thanks to the journalist for this great service to the nation. This is another joint venture of Mush/Zardari governments like NRO. This plunder started in Mushi time and still on in Zardari time and going for final phase. Even the parties involved in Rental Power Projects also invested on both Mushi and Zardari gangs.
ISLAMABAD: All those who have come under a cloud of suspicion in the UN Commission report on Benazir Bhutto’s assassination have been generously and exceptionally treated and rewarded by the present PPP regime.–>Ansar Abbasi The News
By Ansar Abbasi
ISLAMABAD: All those who have come under a cloud of suspicion in the UN Commission report on Benazir Bhutto’s assassination have been generously and exceptionally treated and rewarded by the present PPP regime.
The report found Rehman Malik’s statement as incredible. It blamed the Musharraf regime and talked in a suspicious manner about the role and conduct of the then Rawalpindi’s City Police Officer Saud Aziz. It also expressed its reservations over the role of the then secretary interior Kamal Shah and his inability to properly respond to seriousthreats to Benazir’s life. It also speaks about the dubious role of Nusrat Naeem, the then deputy DG ISI.
Interestingly, the present regime let General Musharraf leave the country. Rehman Malik, chief security officer of Benazir Bhutto, was amongst the first ones to be given key government position. Malik was initially appointed as Adviser to the PM on interior and later made the minister after getting into the Senate. Malik is today one of the most influential ministers and close associates of President Asif Ali Zardari.
Kamal Shah, the then secretary interior, a known favourite of Musharraf was protected and was even given extension in service but was ultimately removed last year.The then CPO Rawalpindi Saud Aziz despite having been identified as an extremely controversial cop to have messed up with the Benazir’s murder case, has been appointed as CPO Multan, the prime minister’s hometown on the personal request of the PM.
The then deputy chief of ISI, Maj-Gen Nusrat Naeem, and a known crony of Musharraf was not promoted by the incumbent Army chief and allowed to retire prematurely, is also reported to be in contact with today’s Presidency as well.
The Commission also said Kamal Shah did not have any clear answer when asked as to why following the Oct 22 threat report, no directive was issued to safeguard Benazir Bhutto. The treatment given to these people by the PPP shows it has no reservations about their role in the Benazir murder. In fact, the PPP did not even register an FIR against the assassination and it is not clear whether any case would now be registered after the UN report, which costs $50 million to the taxpayers.
Note that the purpose of UN commission was fact-finding not fixing the responsibility.
1) Why Musharraf was given a safe exit when even PPP workers think he was responsible for BB’s murder? Was it due to the fact that Mr. Zardari was one of the beneficiaries or it was due to some pressure?
2) Why the key responsible persons continued to work on their positions without proper accountability during the government of PPP including interior ministry officers, police officers, intelligence agency officers including former DG MI Nadeem Ijaz, former ISI head and Vice Army Chief General Kiyani?
3) Kiyani is now Army Chief and was representing Musharraf during NRO deal. Will he allow further investigation on the role of ISI, MI,Musharraf and Kiyani himself?
4) In Rehman Malik’s car, two other persons were also sitting. These two persons are Babar Awan and Musharraf’s close friend and former Core Commander Mangla Lt. General (R) Tauqir Zia(who was also the Chairman PCB during Musharraf time). Will some probe them for their role and negligence?
5) Why the government of Pakistan delayed UN Commission Report for 15 days (till 15th April 2010)? Even though UN Commission didn’t conduct any new interview after 31st March 2010 as opposite to the government’s claim that the Commission is requested to conduct few interviews. Rehman Malik even yesterday revised the same claim.
6) Will this murder go into the dustbin of Waziristan or some serious investigations will be done to investigate this high-profile murder?
Lets see if millions of dollars invested by a poor nation on this report will be of any use or not?
I hope some serious and independent investigation and trial will be conducted for this murder.
9 ) Commission didn’t find evidence against Asif Zardari’s and any of the family members’ involvement in this murder.