Archive

Posts Tagged ‘niazi’

Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report Conclusion–>Need to revisit the past

December 15, 2010 8 comments

Another 16 December is here and I don’t think much lessons are learned from a disaster which could have made any nation with some conscience to think over its strategies. Still our military establishment is involved in dirty politics, working for imperialist agenda and busy in securing their business agenda. Our establishment and politicians have not learned much lessons and are still busy in following unjust practices, suppression and killing of own people to please their masters and fulfil their greed.

“Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.” – Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on 1971

——————————————————————————————————————

Recommendations below are taken from the Supplementary report issued by Hamood ur Rehman Commission which was setup to investigate the events in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

There are parts which are missing as the report is never officially released and it was published by some indian media.

Full Supplementary Report can be downloaded from here :

http://www.insaf.pk/Portals/0/NTForums_Attach/hamoodurrehmancommission-report.pdf

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the concluding portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had made a number of

recommendations based on our study of the various aspects of the causes of the debacle of

1971. Some of these recommendations need to be modified, or amplified, in the light of the fresh

evidence, which we have now recorded: while the need for the others has only been further

emphasised, we believe that the object of setting up this Commission would be fully realised

only if appropriate and early action is taken by the Government on these recommendations.2.

consider that it would be appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally set out at one

place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed reasons and justification for these

recommendations will be found in the relevant Chapters of the Main Report as well as this

Supplementary Report. We are aware that some of these recommendations have already been

implemented, but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this final

summing up.Trials

3.

Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the

Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional

incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their duties and

physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and

resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation’s

demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future

recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war. We accordingly

recommend that the following trials be undertaken without delay.

(I) That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen.

Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a

criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if

necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to

influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both

for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading

some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to

attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of

March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East

Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and

subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of

Pakistan:

(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (I) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in

the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect would

be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war

(iii) That Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, former Commander 1 Corps, be tried for criminal and

wilful neglect of duty in conducting the operations of his Corps in such a manner that nearly 500

villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan were surrendered to the

enemy without a light and as a consequence the Army offensive in the south was seriously

jeopardised;

(iv) That Maj Gen Abid Zahid, former GOC 15 Div, be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful

surrender of a large area comprising nearly 98 villages in the phuklian salient in the Sialkot

district of West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat to the safety of Marala

Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within nearly 1500 yards thereof. He also kept the GHQ

in the dark about Indian occupation of the Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after

the war.

(v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC 18 Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that

his offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area

(Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in

severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert.

(vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, former Commander, Eastern Command, be court-martialled on

15 charges as set out in Chapter III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful

neglect in the performance of his professional and military duties connected with the defence of

East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces to the Indians at a juncture when he still

had the capability and resources to offer resistance.

(vii) That Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by

court martial on five charges listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the Supplementary

Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the defence of Dacca and

showing complete Jack of courage and will to fight, in acquiescing in the decision of the

Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to

put up resistance for a period of two weeks or so, and also for wilfully neglecting to inform the

authorities concerned, on repatriation to Pakistan, about the fact of distribution of Rs.50,000 by

him out of Pakistan currency notes and toher funds at his disposal or under his control in East

Pakistan.

(viii) That Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East

Pakistan, be tried by court martial on five charges listed against him in this Report for showing

undue regard for his personal safety in abandoning his Division, his Divisional troops and area of

responsibility and Vacating his Divisional Headquarters from Chandpur on the 8th of December,

1971; for his wilful insistence on moving by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing

the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to himself

and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for his abandoning valuable signal

equipment at Chandpur; for spreading despondency and alarm by certain conversation on the

12th of December, 1971, at Dacca; and for wilfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report to

GHQ on being specially evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as to conceal the

circumstances of his desertion from him Divisional Headquarters at Chandpur.

(ix) That Brig. G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, former GOS, Eastern Command, Dacca, be tried by court

martial on nine charges as formulated in this Report, for his wilful neglect of duty in advising the

Commander, Eastern Command, as regards the concept and formulation of defence plans,

appreciation of the Indian threat, execution of denial plans, abrupt changes in command,

friendliness with he Indian during captivity and attempts to influence formation Commanders by

threats and inducements to present a co-ordinated story before the GHQ and the Commission

of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East Pakistan.

(x) That Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Commander 107 Brigade, 9 Division, East Pakistan, be

tried by court martial on four charges for displaying wilful neglect in not formulating a sound plan

for the defence of the fortress of Jesore; for failing to properly plan and command the brigade

counter-attack at Gharibpur, for shamefully abandoning the fortress of Jessor and delivering

intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps; and disobeying the orders of the GOC

9 Divison, to withdraw to Magura in the event of a forced withdrawal from Jessore;

(xi) That Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi, former commander 53 Brigade, 39 (ad-hoc) Division,

East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on six charges for displaying culpable lack of initiative,

determination and planning ability in that he failed to occupy and prepare defences at

Mudafarganj as ordered by his GOC on the 4th of December, 1971; for failing to eject the enemy

from Mudafarganj as ordered on the 6th of December, 1971; for shamefully abandoning the

fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December, 1971; for wilful neglect in failing to

properly organise oxfiltration of his troops from the fortress of Laksham to Comilla on the 9th of

December, 1971, thus resulting in heavy casualties and capture of several elements of his

troops on the way; for showing callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksham

124 sick and wounded with two Medical Officers without informing them about the proposed

vacation of the fortress; and for abandoning intact at Laksham all heavy weapons, stocks of

ammunition and supplies for the use of the enemy;

II. Inquiry and Trials for Alleged AtrocitiesThat as recommended in Paragraph 7 of Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report and in

4.

Paragraph 39 of Chapter II of Part V of this Supplementary Report, a high-powered Court or

Commission of Inquiry be set up to investigate into persistent allegations of atrocities said to

have been committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan during its operations from March

to December, 1971, and to hold trials of those who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad

name to the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies of the local population by their acts of

wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people. The composition of the Court of Inquiry,

if not its proceedings, should be publicly announced so as to satisfy national conscience and

international opinion. The Commission feels that sufficient evidence is now available in Pakistan

for a fruitful inquiry to be undertaken in this regard. As the Government of Bangladesh has since

been recognised by Pakistan, it may also be feasible to request the Dacca authorities to

forward to this Court of Inquiry whatever evidence may be available with them.

III. Other Inquiries(I) That allegations of personal immorality, drunkenness and indulgence in corrupt practices

5

against General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan and Maj. Gen Khuda Dad Khan be

properly investigated as there is prima facie evidence to show that their moral degeneration

resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence. In the light of the result of this

inquiry suitable charges may be added against these Officers, during the trials we have already

recommended earlier. The details of the allegations and the evidence relating thereto will be

found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report.

(ii) That similar allegations of personal immorality, acquiring a notorious reputation in this behalf

at Sialkot, Lahore and Dacca, and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan from East to West

Pakistan made against Lt. Gen Niazi should also be inquired into and, if necessary, made the

subject matter of additional charges at the trial earlier recommended in respect of the

performance of his professional duties in East Pakistan. The details of these allegations and

the evidence relating thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report and in

Chapter I of part V of this supplementary Report.

(iii) That an inquiry is also indicated into the disposal of Rs.50, 000 said to have been distributed

by Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division and Director General,

East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces immediately before the surrender on the 16th of December

1971. Details of this matter including the General’s explanation would be found in Paras 21 to

23 of Chapter I of Part V of the Supplementary Report. We have already recommended that this

Officer be tried by a court martial on several charges including his wilful failure to disclose any

facts at all about his sum Rs.50,000. That charge does not necessarily imply any dishonest

practice on his part. The inquiry now suggested can form a part of the charges already

recommended.

(iv) That allegations of indulging in large-scale looting of property in East Pakistan including theft

of Rs.1, 35,00,000 from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Ganj persistently made against

Brig. Jehanazeb Arbab, former Commander 57 Brigade, Lt Col (now Brig) Muzaffar Ali Zahid,

former CO 31 Field Regiment, Lt. Col Basharat Ahmad, former CO 18 Punjab, Lt. Col

Mohammad Taj, former CO 32 Punjab, Lt Col Mohammad Tufail, former CO 55 Field Regiment

and Major Madad Hussain Shah of 18 Punjab, as set out in Paras 24 and 25 of Chapter I of part

V of the Supplementary Report, should be thoroughly inquired into and suitable action taken in

the light of the proved facts.

(v) That an inquiry be held into the allegation, noticed by us in Para 36 of Chapter 1 of Part V of

the Main Report, that while serving in the Martial Law Administration at Multan, Maj. Gen.

Jahanzeb, presumably a Brigadier at that time, demanded a bribe of Rs. one lac from a PCS

Officer posted as Chairman of the Municipal Committee of Multan, on pain of proceeding against

him for corruption under martial Law, as a consequence of which demand the said PCS Officer

is said to have committed suicide leaving behind a letter saying that although he had made only

Rs.15,000 he was being required to pay Rs. one lac to the Martial Law officers. The allegation

was made before the Commission by Brig. Mohammad Abbas Beg (Witness No.9)

(vi) That in inquiry is also necessary into the allegation made against Brig. Hayatullah that he

entertained some wom en in his bunker in the Maqbulpur sector (West Pakistan) on the night of

the 11th or 12th of December, 1971, when Indian shells were falling on his troops. The

allegation was contained in an anonymous letter addressed to the Commission and supported

in evidence before us by the Brigadier Hayatullah’s brigade, Major, namely, Major Munawar

Khan (Witness No.42).

(vii) That it is necessary to investigate into the allegations, as set out in Paragraphs 9 to 14 of

Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report, to the effect that senior Army Commanders grossly

abused their official position and powers under the Martial Law to acquire large allotments of

land, and obtained substantial house buildings loans on extremely generous terms from certain

banking institutions with which they deposited large amounts from departmental funds entrusted

to their care. Those found guilty of corrupt practices should receive the punishment they

deserve under the military law or the ordinary criminal law of the land as the case may be.

(viii) That a thorough investigation be conducted into the suspicion created in the mind of the

Commission, during the recording of additional evidence of Officers repatriated form India, that

there may be some complicity or collusion between the Commander, Easter Command (Lt Gen

A.A.K. Niazi) and his Chief of Staff (Brig G.M. Baqir Saddiqui) on the one hand and the Indian

authorities on the other in the matter of the failure of the Pakistan Armed Forces to carry out

execution of denial plans immediately before the surrender inspite of instructions issued in this

behalf by GHQ on the 10th of December, 1971. We have already included relevant charges in

this behalf against these two Officers, but we consider that it would be in the public interest to

depute a specialized agency to probe into the matter further. On the material available to us we

cannot put the matter higher than suspicion, but we have not been able to find any reasonable,

or even plausible explanation for the orders issued by the Easter Command to stop the

execution of denial plans, particularly in Dacc and Chittagong, thus ensuring the delivery intact

to the Indians of large amounts of war materials and other equipment. Details of these deliveries

will be found in our Chapter VII of Part IV dealing with the aftermath of surrender.

(ix) That an inquiry be held into the circumstances under which Commander Gul Zareen of the

Pakistan Navy was carried from Khulna to Singapore on the 7th of December, 1971, by a

French ship called M.V. Fortescue, thus abandoning his duties at PNS Titumir Naval Base,

Khulna. The case of this Officer was dealt with by us in Paras 12 and 13 of Chapter III of Part V

of the Main Report.

IV. Cases Requiring Departmental ActionWhile examining the course of events and the conduct of war in East Pakistan, we formed a

6.

poor opinion about the performance and capabilities of Brig. S.A.Ansari, ex-Commander 23

Brigade, Brig. Manzoor Ahmad, ex -Commander 57 Brigade, 9 Division, and Brig Abdul Qadir

Khan, ex -Commander 94 brigade, 36 (ad hoc) Division. We consider that their further retention

in service is not in the public interest and they may accordingly be retired.

V. Performance and Conduct of Junior OfficersIn the very nature of things the Commission was not in a position to examine at any length

7.

the conduct and performance of officers below the brigade level, although some case

necessarily came to our notice where the performance of these Officers had a direct bearing on

the fate of important battles or where their conduct transgressed the norms of discipline. Such

cases have been mentioned by us at their proper place, but by and large cases of junior Officers

must be dealt with by the respective service headquarters who have obtained detailed debriefing

reports from all of them and are also in possession of the assessment of their performance by

their immediate superiors.

VI. Measures for Moral Reform in the Armed ForcesWhile dealing at some length with the moral aspect of the 1971 debacle, in Chapter I of Part

8.

V of the Main Report as well as in the corresponding Chapter of the present Supplementary

Report, we have expressed the opinion that there is indeed substance in the widespread

allegation, rather belief, that due to corruption arising out of the performance of Martial Law

duties, lust for wine and women, and greed for lands and houses a large number of senior Army

Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but

also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded

of them for the successful prosecution of the war. Accordingly, we recommend that: -

(I) The Government should call upon all Officers of the Armed Forces to submit declarations of

their assets, both moveable and immovable, and those acquired in the names of their relations

and dependents during the last ten years (they were exempted from submitting such

declarations during the last two periods of martial Law). If on examination of such declarations

any Officer is found to have acquired assets beyond this known means, then appropriate action

should be taken against him

(ii) The Armed Services should devise ways and means to ensure: -

(a) That moral values are not allowed to be compromised by infamous behaviour particularly at

higher levels

(b) That moral rectitude is given due weight along with professional qualities in the matter of

promotion to higher ranks;

(c) That syllabi of academic studies at the military academics and other Service Institutions

should include courses designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious

democratic and political institutions

(d) That use of alcoholic drinks should be banned in military messes and functions

(e) That serious notice should be taken of notorious sexual behaviour and other corrupt

practices

VII. Discipline and Terms and Conditions of Service9.

reasons given therein we make the following recommendations: -

(I) An inter-services study should be undertaken of the operative terms and conditions of service

and amenities available to Officers, JCOs and other ranks of the Services so as to remove

disparities existing in this behalf and causing discontentment among the junior officers and

other ranks of various Services

(ii) The GHQ should consider the advisability of adopting recommendations contained in the

report submitted by the Discipline Committee headed by the late Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan Janjua

(iii) Th e Navy and Air Force might also appoint their own Discipline Committees to consider the

peculiar problems of their Services, such measure to be in addition to the inter-services study

recommended above.

VIII. Improvement and Modernizations of the Pakistan Navy10.

VIII of Part IV of the Main Report, and supplemented by further details of its operations in East

Pakistan is set out in this Supplementary Report, it seems to us that the following steps are

urgently called for to improve our naval capability: -

(I) That immediate attention should be given to he basic requirements for the modernizations of

the Pakistan Navy in order to make it capable of protecting the only sea port of Pakistan and of

keeping the life-lines of the nation open. The Navy has been sadly neglected ever since the first

Martial Law regime, for in the concept of Army Commander the Navy was not expected to play

much of a role. The folly of this theory was fully demonstrated during this war. The Pakistan

Navy, we strongly recommend, should have its own air arm of suitable aircraft for the purpose of

reconnaissance and for defence against missile boats. This is the only way in which the threat

posed by the growing Indian Navy and her missible boats can be countered.

(ii) There is urgent need for developing a separate harbour for the Navy away from Karachi, from

where the Navy can protect the approaches to Karachi more effectively

(iii) In view of the serious handicaps which were posed by the late conveyance of the D-day and

the H-hour to the Pakistan Navy and its total exclusion from he planning for war, the need for

making the Navy a fully operative member in he joint Chiefs of Staff Organization is imperative.

IX. Improvement in the Role of P.A.F.11. In Section (C) of Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report as well as in a separate Chapter

of the present supplement (viz Chapter X of Part III), we have discussed at length the role and

performance of the P.A.F. in the 1971 war. In the light of that discussion, we recommend as

follows: -

(I) We are not convinced that a more forward-looking posture cannot be adopted by eh Air Force

having regard to the peculiar needs of the country. We recommend, therefore, that Pakistan

should have more forward air fields located at such places from where it might be in a position to

give more protection to our vital line of communication as well as to major centres of industry.

The adoption of such a fo rward strategy would also increase the striking capabilities of our

fighters.

(ii) There is need also to improve the working of our early warning system. The time lag

between the observation of an enemy aircraft by the first line of Mobile Observer Units and the

final collation of that information in the Air Operation Centre takes unduly long because of the

draftory system of reporting adopted. Training exercises to coordinate the working of the various

agencies employed for the operation of the early warning system should be held periodically to

keep them at a high pitch of efficiency.

(iii) The Karachi Port should also be provided as soon as possible, with a low level seawardlooking

radar which it seriously lacks and due to the want of which it suffered many handicaps

during the last war.

(iv) That with the increased Indian capability of blockading Karachi with missile boats the air

defence of Karachi should be attached greater importance. Leaving the defence of Karachi to be

tackled only by one squadron of fighters and a half squadron of bombers was extremely unwise.

X. Re-organization of Air Defence of Pakistan12. The subject of air defence has been discussed by us at some length in section (13) of

Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report. In the light of that discussion, we make the following

recommendations: -

(a) Since it will not be possible for us to enlarge our Air Force to any appreciable extent in the

near future, we strongly recommend that we should strengthen our air defence programmes by

at least doubling our holdings of anti-craft guns by the end of 1972 and ultimately raising it under

a phased programme to 342 Batteries as suggested by the Air Force.

(b) Efforts should also be made to procure ground to air missiles for a more effective air defence

of the country.

(c) If ground-to-air missiles are not available, then efforts should also be made to get radar

controlled medium HAA guns from China.

XI. Recommendations with Regard to Civil Defence Measures13.

consider that the following measures are called for to improve the civil defence aspects in

Pakistan: -

(a) The civil defence arrangements should be placed under the Ministry of Defence, and not be

made the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior or other individual departments. The Central

Government should accept the responsibility for the overall control and organization of the civil

defence of the country, as Provincial Governments have not been able to shoulder this

responsibility effectively in the past.

(b) Steps should be taken to improve the fire-fighting facilities in the country, particularly in ports

and industrial areas.

(c) Industrialists keeping inflammable materials near lines of communications and other

vulnerable points should be induce, or in fact obliged under the law, to accept responsibility for

the protection of their materials, and make effective arrangements for fire-fighting in their

establishments.

(d) Provision should be made for storing large quantitative of petrol and other fuels underground.

XII. Higher Direction of War14.

Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main Report, and in the light of that discussion, we proposed the

following measures: -

(a) The three Service Headquarters should be located at one place along with the Ministry of

Defence.

(b) The posts of Commander-in-Chiefs should be replaced by Chiefs of Staff of the respective

services (This, we understand, has already been done by the Government)/

(c) The Defence Committee of the Cabinet should be re-activated and it should be ensured that

its meetings are held regularly. A positive direction should be added in its Charter to give the

Cabinet Division the right to initiate proceedings for the convening of its meetings should be held

even in the absence of the President or the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of the senior

most minister present.

(d) There should also be a Defence Ministers Committee and the Ministry of Defence should

assume its rightful position as a policy-making body and incorporating policy, decisions into

defence programmes after consultations with the three services. This should ensure the

preparations of realistic plans for the national defence with in the agreed framework of …….

allocations. It should meet under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister and comprise the

Defence Secretary, the three service chiefs, the financial advi ser for defence, the Director

General of Civil Defence, the Director General of munitions production, the Director General of

Defence Procurement, the Director General of inter-services Intelligence Directorate, the

Defence Scientific Adviser and any other Central Secretary or Service officer who may be

required for a particular item on agenda. If the defence portfolio is held by the President or the

Prime Minister then its meeting may be presided over by a Deputy Minister for or by the

Minister in charge of Defence Production (illegible) Minister is available, the Defence Secretary

should preside, irrespective of any considerations of protocol or (illegible)

(e) The Secretaries Coordination Committee as at present constituted, should continue

(f) (illegible) The three services should share (illegible) joint responsibility for national defence

and that all plans and programmes for the development of the (illegible) forces should be based

on joint (illegible) objectives, it is necessary. Therefore, that the three services Chief should

(illegible) As Joint Chiefs of Staff and not merely as individual Heads of their respective Services.

This Joint Chiefs or Staff should constitute a corporate body with collective responsibility having

its own (illegible) staff for evolving joint plans and its own Headquarters located on one place.

The (illegible) of chairman of this Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held by rotation, irrespective of the

personal ranks enjoyed by the three service chiefs. The duration of the tenure should be one

year at a time and the chairmanship should commence with the (illegible) Service, mainly, the

Army. A detailed Chapter of duties for this Joint Chiefs of Staff has been suggested in Annexure

‘I’ of Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main report.

(g) Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organisation there will not only by a Secretariat but also a

joint planning staff drawn from all the three Services. It might be designed as the Joint

Secretariat and Planning Staff. It will be responsible not only for providing the necessary

secretarial assistance (illegible) Also for evolving the joint defence plans and (illegible) studies

of processing of all matters of inter-(illegible) The Joint Chief of Staff may also have other Joint

Common to assist them on such matters, as it may consider necessary.

(h) The weakness, in the (illegible) of the armed forces, which have been brought by light,

(illegible) feel that there is need for an institution like the America” (illegible) General’ which

should be a body changed was the duty of carrying out surprise inspection and calling area the

formations and (illegible) concerned to demonstrate that the (illegible)

(this para not readable)

(i) We have also felt the (illegible) for in Institute of Strategic Studies, preferably as a part of a

University Programme. The need for such an (illegible) has been highlighted by the weakness in

our joint strategic panning by the three Services. We are of the opinion that such an Institute will

go a long way in producing studies of value for examination by the other defence organizations.

XIII National Security CouncilHaving examined the working of the National Security Council in Chapter XI of Part IV of the

15.

Main Report we are of the opinion that there is no need for super-(illegible) such an organization

on the Directorate of Intelligence Bureau and the Directorate of Inter-services Intelligence. The

Security Council should therefore be abolished.

XIV. The Farman Ali incidentIn view of the fresh evidence examined by us regarding the role of Maj Gen Farman Ali,

16.

which we have discussed in the concluding portion of Chapter III of Part V of the Supplementary

Report, recommendation No. 7 made in the Main Report has now become (illegible); as we have

found that in delivering a message to Mr. Paul Mare Henry, Assistant Secretary General of the

United Nations. Maj Gen Farman Ali, acted under the instructions of the Governor of East

Pakistan, who in turn had been authorised by the then President of Pakistan to make certain

proposals for settlement in East Pakistan at the critical juncture.

 

Sanih e Mashriqi Pakistan–>Dr. AQ Khan on 1971 in Jang

December 23, 2009 6 comments

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has written a must read thought provoking article on 1971 Independence of Bangladesh.

Be Ghairti–>Dr. A.Q Khan article in Jang

December 3, 2009 1 comment

Another column on national self-esteem and self-respect by Dr. A.Q Khan published in Jang Karachi which I hope will start another useful debate on how our leaders sold their souls to foreign powers without any shame for their acts.

His previous column ‘Ghairat Kahan Hai Tu’ really made people to think on our behavior and actions as a nation and the sort of leadership coming on our national scene.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 43 other followers