Another 16 December is here and I don’t think much lessons are learned from a disaster which could have made any nation with some conscience to think over its strategies. Still our military establishment is involved in dirty politics, working for imperialist agenda and busy in securing their business agenda. Our establishment and politicians have not learned much lessons and are still busy in following unjust practices, suppression and killing of own people to please their masters and fulfil their greed.
“Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.” – Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on 1971
Recommendations below are taken from the Supplementary report issued by Hamood ur Rehman Commission which was setup to investigate the events in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
There are parts which are missing as the report is never officially released and it was published by some indian media.
Full Supplementary Report can be downloaded from here :
In the concluding portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had made a number of
recommendations based on our study of the various aspects of the causes of the debacle of
1971. Some of these recommendations need to be modified, or amplified, in the light of the fresh
evidence, which we have now recorded: while the need for the others has only been further
emphasised, we believe that the object of setting up this Commission would be fully realised
only if appropriate and early action is taken by the Government on these recommendations.2.
consider that it would be appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally set out at one
place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed reasons and justification for these
recommendations will be found in the relevant Chapters of the Main Report as well as this
Supplementary Report. We are aware that some of these recommendations have already been
implemented, but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this final
Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the
Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional
incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their duties and
physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and
resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation’s
demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future
recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war. We accordingly
recommend that the following trials be undertaken without delay.
(I) That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen.
Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a
criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if
necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to
influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both
for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading
some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to
attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of
March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East
Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and
subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of
(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (I) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in
the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect would
be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war
(iii) That Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, former Commander 1 Corps, be tried for criminal and
wilful neglect of duty in conducting the operations of his Corps in such a manner that nearly 500
villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan were surrendered to the
enemy without a light and as a consequence the Army offensive in the south was seriously
(iv) That Maj Gen Abid Zahid, former GOC 15 Div, be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful
surrender of a large area comprising nearly 98 villages in the phuklian salient in the Sialkot
district of West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat to the safety of Marala
Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within nearly 1500 yards thereof. He also kept the GHQ
in the dark about Indian occupation of the Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after
(v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC 18 Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that
his offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area
(Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in
severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert.
(vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, former Commander, Eastern Command, be court-martialled on
15 charges as set out in Chapter III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful
neglect in the performance of his professional and military duties connected with the defence of
East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces to the Indians at a juncture when he still
had the capability and resources to offer resistance.
(vii) That Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by
court martial on five charges listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the Supplementary
Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the defence of Dacca and
showing complete Jack of courage and will to fight, in acquiescing in the decision of the
Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to
put up resistance for a period of two weeks or so, and also for wilfully neglecting to inform the
authorities concerned, on repatriation to Pakistan, about the fact of distribution of Rs.50,000 by
him out of Pakistan currency notes and toher funds at his disposal or under his control in East
(viii) That Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East
Pakistan, be tried by court martial on five charges listed against him in this Report for showing
undue regard for his personal safety in abandoning his Division, his Divisional troops and area of
responsibility and Vacating his Divisional Headquarters from Chandpur on the 8th of December,
1971; for his wilful insistence on moving by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing
the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to himself
and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for his abandoning valuable signal
equipment at Chandpur; for spreading despondency and alarm by certain conversation on the
12th of December, 1971, at Dacca; and for wilfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report to
GHQ on being specially evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as to conceal the
circumstances of his desertion from him Divisional Headquarters at Chandpur.
(ix) That Brig. G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, former GOS, Eastern Command, Dacca, be tried by court
martial on nine charges as formulated in this Report, for his wilful neglect of duty in advising the
Commander, Eastern Command, as regards the concept and formulation of defence plans,
appreciation of the Indian threat, execution of denial plans, abrupt changes in command,
friendliness with he Indian during captivity and attempts to influence formation Commanders by
threats and inducements to present a co-ordinated story before the GHQ and the Commission
of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East Pakistan.
(x) That Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Commander 107 Brigade, 9 Division, East Pakistan, be
tried by court martial on four charges for displaying wilful neglect in not formulating a sound plan
for the defence of the fortress of Jesore; for failing to properly plan and command the brigade
counter-attack at Gharibpur, for shamefully abandoning the fortress of Jessor and delivering
intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps; and disobeying the orders of the GOC
9 Divison, to withdraw to Magura in the event of a forced withdrawal from Jessore;
(xi) That Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi, former commander 53 Brigade, 39 (ad-hoc) Division,
East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on six charges for displaying culpable lack of initiative,
determination and planning ability in that he failed to occupy and prepare defences at
Mudafarganj as ordered by his GOC on the 4th of December, 1971; for failing to eject the enemy
from Mudafarganj as ordered on the 6th of December, 1971; for shamefully abandoning the
fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December, 1971; for wilful neglect in failing to
properly organise oxfiltration of his troops from the fortress of Laksham to Comilla on the 9th of
December, 1971, thus resulting in heavy casualties and capture of several elements of his
troops on the way; for showing callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksham
124 sick and wounded with two Medical Officers without informing them about the proposed
vacation of the fortress; and for abandoning intact at Laksham all heavy weapons, stocks of
ammunition and supplies for the use of the enemy;
II. Inquiry and Trials for Alleged AtrocitiesThat as recommended in Paragraph 7 of Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report and in
Paragraph 39 of Chapter II of Part V of this Supplementary Report, a high-powered Court or
Commission of Inquiry be set up to investigate into persistent allegations of atrocities said to
have been committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan during its operations from March
to December, 1971, and to hold trials of those who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad
name to the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies of the local population by their acts of
wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people. The composition of the Court of Inquiry,
if not its proceedings, should be publicly announced so as to satisfy national conscience and
international opinion. The Commission feels that sufficient evidence is now available in Pakistan
for a fruitful inquiry to be undertaken in this regard. As the Government of Bangladesh has since
been recognised by Pakistan, it may also be feasible to request the Dacca authorities to
forward to this Court of Inquiry whatever evidence may be available with them.
III. Other Inquiries(I) That allegations of personal immorality, drunkenness and indulgence in corrupt practices
against General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan and Maj. Gen Khuda Dad Khan be
properly investigated as there is prima facie evidence to show that their moral degeneration
resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence. In the light of the result of this
inquiry suitable charges may be added against these Officers, during the trials we have already
recommended earlier. The details of the allegations and the evidence relating thereto will be
found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report.
(ii) That similar allegations of personal immorality, acquiring a notorious reputation in this behalf
at Sialkot, Lahore and Dacca, and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan from East to West
Pakistan made against Lt. Gen Niazi should also be inquired into and, if necessary, made the
subject matter of additional charges at the trial earlier recommended in respect of the
performance of his professional duties in East Pakistan. The details of these allegations and
the evidence relating thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report and in
Chapter I of part V of this supplementary Report.
(iii) That an inquiry is also indicated into the disposal of Rs.50, 000 said to have been distributed
by Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division and Director General,
East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces immediately before the surrender on the 16th of December
1971. Details of this matter including the General’s explanation would be found in Paras 21 to
23 of Chapter I of Part V of the Supplementary Report. We have already recommended that this
Officer be tried by a court martial on several charges including his wilful failure to disclose any
facts at all about his sum Rs.50,000. That charge does not necessarily imply any dishonest
practice on his part. The inquiry now suggested can form a part of the charges already
(iv) That allegations of indulging in large-scale looting of property in East Pakistan including theft
of Rs.1, 35,00,000 from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Ganj persistently made against
Brig. Jehanazeb Arbab, former Commander 57 Brigade, Lt Col (now Brig) Muzaffar Ali Zahid,
former CO 31 Field Regiment, Lt. Col Basharat Ahmad, former CO 18 Punjab, Lt. Col
Mohammad Taj, former CO 32 Punjab, Lt Col Mohammad Tufail, former CO 55 Field Regiment
and Major Madad Hussain Shah of 18 Punjab, as set out in Paras 24 and 25 of Chapter I of part
V of the Supplementary Report, should be thoroughly inquired into and suitable action taken in
the light of the proved facts.
(v) That an inquiry be held into the allegation, noticed by us in Para 36 of Chapter 1 of Part V of
the Main Report, that while serving in the Martial Law Administration at Multan, Maj. Gen.
Jahanzeb, presumably a Brigadier at that time, demanded a bribe of Rs. one lac from a PCS
Officer posted as Chairman of the Municipal Committee of Multan, on pain of proceeding against
him for corruption under martial Law, as a consequence of which demand the said PCS Officer
is said to have committed suicide leaving behind a letter saying that although he had made only
Rs.15,000 he was being required to pay Rs. one lac to the Martial Law officers. The allegation
was made before the Commission by Brig. Mohammad Abbas Beg (Witness No.9)
(vi) That in inquiry is also necessary into the allegation made against Brig. Hayatullah that he
entertained some wom en in his bunker in the Maqbulpur sector (West Pakistan) on the night of
the 11th or 12th of December, 1971, when Indian shells were falling on his troops. The
allegation was contained in an anonymous letter addressed to the Commission and supported
in evidence before us by the Brigadier Hayatullah’s brigade, Major, namely, Major Munawar
Khan (Witness No.42).
(vii) That it is necessary to investigate into the allegations, as set out in Paragraphs 9 to 14 of
Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report, to the effect that senior Army Commanders grossly
abused their official position and powers under the Martial Law to acquire large allotments of
land, and obtained substantial house buildings loans on extremely generous terms from certain
banking institutions with which they deposited large amounts from departmental funds entrusted
to their care. Those found guilty of corrupt practices should receive the punishment they
deserve under the military law or the ordinary criminal law of the land as the case may be.
(viii) That a thorough investigation be conducted into the suspicion created in the mind of the
Commission, during the recording of additional evidence of Officers repatriated form India, that
there may be some complicity or collusion between the Commander, Easter Command (Lt Gen
A.A.K. Niazi) and his Chief of Staff (Brig G.M. Baqir Saddiqui) on the one hand and the Indian
authorities on the other in the matter of the failure of the Pakistan Armed Forces to carry out
execution of denial plans immediately before the surrender inspite of instructions issued in this
behalf by GHQ on the 10th of December, 1971. We have already included relevant charges in
this behalf against these two Officers, but we consider that it would be in the public interest to
depute a specialized agency to probe into the matter further. On the material available to us we
cannot put the matter higher than suspicion, but we have not been able to find any reasonable,
or even plausible explanation for the orders issued by the Easter Command to stop the
execution of denial plans, particularly in Dacc and Chittagong, thus ensuring the delivery intact
to the Indians of large amounts of war materials and other equipment. Details of these deliveries
will be found in our Chapter VII of Part IV dealing with the aftermath of surrender.
(ix) That an inquiry be held into the circumstances under which Commander Gul Zareen of the
Pakistan Navy was carried from Khulna to Singapore on the 7th of December, 1971, by a
French ship called M.V. Fortescue, thus abandoning his duties at PNS Titumir Naval Base,
Khulna. The case of this Officer was dealt with by us in Paras 12 and 13 of Chapter III of Part V
of the Main Report.
IV. Cases Requiring Departmental ActionWhile examining the course of events and the conduct of war in East Pakistan, we formed a
poor opinion about the performance and capabilities of Brig. S.A.Ansari, ex-Commander 23
Brigade, Brig. Manzoor Ahmad, ex -Commander 57 Brigade, 9 Division, and Brig Abdul Qadir
Khan, ex -Commander 94 brigade, 36 (ad hoc) Division. We consider that their further retention
in service is not in the public interest and they may accordingly be retired.
V. Performance and Conduct of Junior OfficersIn the very nature of things the Commission was not in a position to examine at any length
the conduct and performance of officers below the brigade level, although some case
necessarily came to our notice where the performance of these Officers had a direct bearing on
the fate of important battles or where their conduct transgressed the norms of discipline. Such
cases have been mentioned by us at their proper place, but by and large cases of junior Officers
must be dealt with by the respective service headquarters who have obtained detailed debriefing
reports from all of them and are also in possession of the assessment of their performance by
their immediate superiors.
VI. Measures for Moral Reform in the Armed ForcesWhile dealing at some length with the moral aspect of the 1971 debacle, in Chapter I of Part
V of the Main Report as well as in the corresponding Chapter of the present Supplementary
Report, we have expressed the opinion that there is indeed substance in the widespread
allegation, rather belief, that due to corruption arising out of the performance of Martial Law
duties, lust for wine and women, and greed for lands and houses a large number of senior Army
Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but
also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded
of them for the successful prosecution of the war. Accordingly, we recommend that: -
(I) The Government should call upon all Officers of the Armed Forces to submit declarations of
their assets, both moveable and immovable, and those acquired in the names of their relations
and dependents during the last ten years (they were exempted from submitting such
declarations during the last two periods of martial Law). If on examination of such declarations
any Officer is found to have acquired assets beyond this known means, then appropriate action
should be taken against him
(ii) The Armed Services should devise ways and means to ensure: -
(a) That moral values are not allowed to be compromised by infamous behaviour particularly at
(b) That moral rectitude is given due weight along with professional qualities in the matter of
promotion to higher ranks;
(c) That syllabi of academic studies at the military academics and other Service Institutions
should include courses designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious
democratic and political institutions
(d) That use of alcoholic drinks should be banned in military messes and functions
(e) That serious notice should be taken of notorious sexual behaviour and other corrupt
VII. Discipline and Terms and Conditions of Service9.
reasons given therein we make the following recommendations: -
(I) An inter-services study should be undertaken of the operative terms and conditions of service
and amenities available to Officers, JCOs and other ranks of the Services so as to remove
disparities existing in this behalf and causing discontentment among the junior officers and
other ranks of various Services
(ii) The GHQ should consider the advisability of adopting recommendations contained in the
report submitted by the Discipline Committee headed by the late Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan Janjua
(iii) Th e Navy and Air Force might also appoint their own Discipline Committees to consider the
peculiar problems of their Services, such measure to be in addition to the inter-services study
VIII. Improvement and Modernizations of the Pakistan Navy10.
VIII of Part IV of the Main Report, and supplemented by further details of its operations in East
Pakistan is set out in this Supplementary Report, it seems to us that the following steps are
urgently called for to improve our naval capability: -
(I) That immediate attention should be given to he basic requirements for the modernizations of
the Pakistan Navy in order to make it capable of protecting the only sea port of Pakistan and of
keeping the life-lines of the nation open. The Navy has been sadly neglected ever since the first
Martial Law regime, for in the concept of Army Commander the Navy was not expected to play
much of a role. The folly of this theory was fully demonstrated during this war. The Pakistan
Navy, we strongly recommend, should have its own air arm of suitable aircraft for the purpose of
reconnaissance and for defence against missile boats. This is the only way in which the threat
posed by the growing Indian Navy and her missible boats can be countered.
(ii) There is urgent need for developing a separate harbour for the Navy away from Karachi, from
where the Navy can protect the approaches to Karachi more effectively
(iii) In view of the serious handicaps which were posed by the late conveyance of the D-day and
the H-hour to the Pakistan Navy and its total exclusion from he planning for war, the need for
making the Navy a fully operative member in he joint Chiefs of Staff Organization is imperative.
IX. Improvement in the Role of P.A.F.11. In Section (C) of Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report as well as in a separate Chapter
of the present supplement (viz Chapter X of Part III), we have discussed at length the role and
performance of the P.A.F. in the 1971 war. In the light of that discussion, we recommend as
(I) We are not convinced that a more forward-looking posture cannot be adopted by eh Air Force
having regard to the peculiar needs of the country. We recommend, therefore, that Pakistan
should have more forward air fields located at such places from where it might be in a position to
give more protection to our vital line of communication as well as to major centres of industry.
The adoption of such a fo rward strategy would also increase the striking capabilities of our
(ii) There is need also to improve the working of our early warning system. The time lag
between the observation of an enemy aircraft by the first line of Mobile Observer Units and the
final collation of that information in the Air Operation Centre takes unduly long because of the
draftory system of reporting adopted. Training exercises to coordinate the working of the various
agencies employed for the operation of the early warning system should be held periodically to
keep them at a high pitch of efficiency.
(iii) The Karachi Port should also be provided as soon as possible, with a low level seawardlooking
radar which it seriously lacks and due to the want of which it suffered many handicaps
during the last war.
(iv) That with the increased Indian capability of blockading Karachi with missile boats the air
defence of Karachi should be attached greater importance. Leaving the defence of Karachi to be
tackled only by one squadron of fighters and a half squadron of bombers was extremely unwise.
X. Re-organization of Air Defence of Pakistan12. The subject of air defence has been discussed by us at some length in section (13) of
Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report. In the light of that discussion, we make the following
(a) Since it will not be possible for us to enlarge our Air Force to any appreciable extent in the
near future, we strongly recommend that we should strengthen our air defence programmes by
at least doubling our holdings of anti-craft guns by the end of 1972 and ultimately raising it under
a phased programme to 342 Batteries as suggested by the Air Force.
(b) Efforts should also be made to procure ground to air missiles for a more effective air defence
of the country.
(c) If ground-to-air missiles are not available, then efforts should also be made to get radar
controlled medium HAA guns from China.
XI. Recommendations with Regard to Civil Defence Measures13.
consider that the following measures are called for to improve the civil defence aspects in
(a) The civil defence arrangements should be placed under the Ministry of Defence, and not be
made the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior or other individual departments. The Central
Government should accept the responsibility for the overall control and organization of the civil
defence of the country, as Provincial Governments have not been able to shoulder this
responsibility effectively in the past.
(b) Steps should be taken to improve the fire-fighting facilities in the country, particularly in ports
and industrial areas.
(c) Industrialists keeping inflammable materials near lines of communications and other
vulnerable points should be induce, or in fact obliged under the law, to accept responsibility for
the protection of their materials, and make effective arrangements for fire-fighting in their
(d) Provision should be made for storing large quantitative of petrol and other fuels underground.
XII. Higher Direction of War14.
Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main Report, and in the light of that discussion, we proposed the
following measures: -
(a) The three Service Headquarters should be located at one place along with the Ministry of
(b) The posts of Commander-in-Chiefs should be replaced by Chiefs of Staff of the respective
services (This, we understand, has already been done by the Government)/
(c) The Defence Committee of the Cabinet should be re-activated and it should be ensured that
its meetings are held regularly. A positive direction should be added in its Charter to give the
Cabinet Division the right to initiate proceedings for the convening of its meetings should be held
even in the absence of the President or the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of the senior
most minister present.
(d) There should also be a Defence Ministers Committee and the Ministry of Defence should
assume its rightful position as a policy-making body and incorporating policy, decisions into
defence programmes after consultations with the three services. This should ensure the
preparations of realistic plans for the national defence with in the agreed framework of …….
allocations. It should meet under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister and comprise the
Defence Secretary, the three service chiefs, the financial advi ser for defence, the Director
General of Civil Defence, the Director General of munitions production, the Director General of
Defence Procurement, the Director General of inter-services Intelligence Directorate, the
Defence Scientific Adviser and any other Central Secretary or Service officer who may be
required for a particular item on agenda. If the defence portfolio is held by the President or the
Prime Minister then its meeting may be presided over by a Deputy Minister for or by the
Minister in charge of Defence Production (illegible) Minister is available, the Defence Secretary
should preside, irrespective of any considerations of protocol or (illegible)
(e) The Secretaries Coordination Committee as at present constituted, should continue
(f) (illegible) The three services should share (illegible) joint responsibility for national defence
and that all plans and programmes for the development of the (illegible) forces should be based
on joint (illegible) objectives, it is necessary. Therefore, that the three services Chief should
(illegible) As Joint Chiefs of Staff and not merely as individual Heads of their respective Services.
This Joint Chiefs or Staff should constitute a corporate body with collective responsibility having
its own (illegible) staff for evolving joint plans and its own Headquarters located on one place.
The (illegible) of chairman of this Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held by rotation, irrespective of the
personal ranks enjoyed by the three service chiefs. The duration of the tenure should be one
year at a time and the chairmanship should commence with the (illegible) Service, mainly, the
Army. A detailed Chapter of duties for this Joint Chiefs of Staff has been suggested in Annexure
‘I’ of Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main report.
(g) Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organisation there will not only by a Secretariat but also a
joint planning staff drawn from all the three Services. It might be designed as the Joint
Secretariat and Planning Staff. It will be responsible not only for providing the necessary
secretarial assistance (illegible) Also for evolving the joint defence plans and (illegible) studies
of processing of all matters of inter-(illegible) The Joint Chief of Staff may also have other Joint
Common to assist them on such matters, as it may consider necessary.
(h) The weakness, in the (illegible) of the armed forces, which have been brought by light,
(illegible) feel that there is need for an institution like the America” (illegible) General’ which
should be a body changed was the duty of carrying out surprise inspection and calling area the
formations and (illegible) concerned to demonstrate that the (illegible)
(this para not readable)
(i) We have also felt the (illegible) for in Institute of Strategic Studies, preferably as a part of a
University Programme. The need for such an (illegible) has been highlighted by the weakness in
our joint strategic panning by the three Services. We are of the opinion that such an Institute will
go a long way in producing studies of value for examination by the other defence organizations.
XIII National Security CouncilHaving examined the working of the National Security Council in Chapter XI of Part IV of the
Main Report we are of the opinion that there is no need for super-(illegible) such an organization
on the Directorate of Intelligence Bureau and the Directorate of Inter-services Intelligence. The
Security Council should therefore be abolished.
XIV. The Farman Ali incidentIn view of the fresh evidence examined by us regarding the role of Maj Gen Farman Ali,
which we have discussed in the concluding portion of Chapter III of Part V of the Supplementary
Report, recommendation No. 7 made in the Main Report has now become (illegible); as we have
found that in delivering a message to Mr. Paul Mare Henry, Assistant Secretary General of the
United Nations. Maj Gen Farman Ali, acted under the instructions of the Governor of East
Pakistan, who in turn had been authorised by the then President of Pakistan to make certain
proposals for settlement in East Pakistan at the critical juncture.
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has written a must read thought provoking article on 1971 Independence of Bangladesh.
History teaches lots of lessons and nations which don’t learn from it often become a forgotten part of it.
Below are the words of Hamood ur Rehman commission report. The commission was made to investigate the 1971 Fall of Dhaka or Independence of Bangladesh. As Bangladesh is a sovereign state now and we wish best of luck to them on their independence day.
“Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.” Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on 1971
It seems we have not learned the lesson from our history and still repeating it in NWFP,Baluchistan and FATA.