Troop worshipers and Martial Law

Mad troop worshipers say we need martial law to improve things. A kind reminder for them:

a) This war mess is a gift from Musharraf martial law.

b) The initial mistake of jumping into cold war was made by military and Ayub’s martial law regime and the same policy was followed by Yahya, Bhutto (A civilian martial law administrator appointed by army and trained by General Ayub) and Gen Zia.

c) 90s, despite corruption and mismanagement was much safer and better.

d) Many national institutions like SUPARCO,NESCOM, NLC (the collapsed bridge fame) etc are under direct or indirect control of army. In most countries such institutions are run by civilians. SUPARCO is a failed organization when it comes to research and development in real space sciences and astronomy. Most of the time they do some missile work and some work with Chinese companies. The reason is simple that instead of being led by top level scientists it is being run by former or serving khakis with no brain.

e) Even the biggest city of Pakistan i.e. Karachi is directly or indirectly under administrative control of occupied armed forces in the form of DHAs, military cantonments and civil cantonment areas who have to pay extortion not only to local political and land mafias but also to military mafias (in the form of absurd charges and taxes) who milk money from civil cantonment areas, put restrictions on civilian liberties and don’t do shit to improve things there.

f) Not only that, army is doing everything from running marriage halls, banks, factories and it has occupied a great deal of land and other economic resources of this country.

g) Army ,ISI and MI waste resources on spying journalists, judges and creating puppets in media (like Zaid Hamid) and politics or shutting down channels like Geo.

It shouldn’t be hard to see why we continuously see intelligence and security failures or why we are still stuck in this war on terror mess? The prime security institution was never designed to be a defender of people or constitution, it was designed by British to work as proxy rulers. Cantonment areas are a reminder of such mindset. It will be interesting to see how much area of Newyork, Shanghai, Mumbai, London or even #Moscow is controlled by army like the so called Pakistan army and air force control or occupy Karachi.

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Karachi Airport and Taftan Border attacks on Shia Zaireen

First of all, I strongly condemn attacks on Shia Zaireens at Taftan border and attack on Karachi Airport by some militants. Now we should try to find the root causes of the mess we are in.

Instead of trying to come out of the mess, many people in Pakistan start chanting for more war and more mess when incidents like Taftan Attack or Karachi Airport attack happen. Its like asking for more fire when your house is burning.

Last time when Pakistan Army and Air force jet bombed its own civilian populations, I pointed out that those who are supporting these jet bombings shouldn’t forget about their support for more mess when some suicide attack or some other terrorist activity will follow up these bombings. Whether its a reaction of those jet bombings or some third party is merely using the situation to increase the temperature, its the bombings which provided the impetus.

Also these attacks again remind us that Pakistani security institutions are not designed to defend people.

They are designed to defend dictators like Musharraf, attack media houses, attack judiciary, bomb villages and strengthen their control over political, land and other economic resources of the country.

Serious restructuring is required to make these institutions into defenders of the country from occupied mercenary armed forces.

Recent security and intelligence failure at Karachi Airport shouldn’t be a surprise as these good for nothing institutions are busy in protecting Pervez Musharraf, hiding their asses in missing persons case, bombing villages for dollars, running over Geo and controlling more power for some interest groups.

People should also question the Uzbak and Indian weapons rhetoric. We need to know what were the security institutions doing when they were entering the area? Saying that Uzbaks were involved doesn’t undermine the failure.

Current setup like 2008 setup is just a face of democracy, main players are same. Musharraf is still largely above the law and enjoying full security and support of his juniors in the army. Zardari and Nawaz cannot change anything as they got power by making deals with the army.

Things don’t get rotten overnight. First Ayub Khan pushed Pakistan into cold war, then Yahya played his part by introducing genocide of common populations and people digested it as the victims were Bengalis not “A” class human beings of this country, then Zia exploited Mullahism to take control of more power and pushed Pakistan more into cold war and then Musharraf and his legacy Kiyani, Raheel Sharif, Pasha and Zaheer ul Islam types pushed Pakistan into more imported conflicts like this war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Also these martial laws resulted in setting wrong priorities for security institutions.

Agencies and federal government are saying that they created a security alert four months ago regard the possibility of such attacks. This is totally absurd. If you were planning to do new wave of jet bombings and derailing the dialogues then of-course you must be aware of the possible back lash on strategic locations.

10 terrorists made their way into a main airport and security agencies were busy in conquering Geo News or doing aerial bombings over villages. At night time police and rangers stop common citizens on daily basis just to take money out of their pockets but often we see terrorist groups end up entering high security installation without any serious resistance. This shows serious lack in training and failure of setting proper priorities.Now they will use the rhetoric of “Uzbaks” with “Indian weapons” to hide their incompetency.

We need to realize that current security setup is not designed and is not capable of defending the people, it only serves few interest groups.

Dictatorships have contributed to the failure and Musharraf tenure added new dimensions of failure by bringing more foreign conflicts at home which this current rotten setup is not capable of handling so in frustration the pawns or so called soldiers end up running over journalists, common citizens or bombing villages.

We need a serious revision of Pakistan’s security setup and we need a culture of transparency and accountability in the affairs of military establishment. We need to get rid of this legacy of failures and culture of troop worship to bring some positive change in Pakistan.

Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report Conclusion–>Need to revisit the past

Another 16 December is here and I don’t think much lessons are learned from a disaster which could have made any nation with some conscience to think over its strategies. Still our military establishment is involved in dirty politics, working for imperialist agenda and busy in securing their business agenda. Our establishment and politicians have not learned much lessons and are still busy in following unjust practices, suppression and killing of own people to please their masters and fulfil their greed.

“Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.” — Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on 1971

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Recommendations below are taken from the Supplementary report issued by Hamood ur Rehman Commission which was setup to investigate the events in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

There are parts which are missing as the report is never officially released and it was published by some indian media.

Full Supplementary Report can be downloaded from here :

http://www.insaf.pk/Portals/0/NTForums_Attach/hamoodurrehmancommission-report.pdf

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the concluding portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had made a number of

recommendations based on our study of the various aspects of the causes of the debacle of

1971. Some of these recommendations need to be modified, or amplified, in the light of the fresh

evidence, which we have now recorded: while the need for the others has only been further

emphasised, we believe that the object of setting up this Commission would be fully realised

only if appropriate and early action is taken by the Government on these recommendations.2.

consider that it would be appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally set out at one

place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed reasons and justification for these

recommendations will be found in the relevant Chapters of the Main Report as well as this

Supplementary Report. We are aware that some of these recommendations have already been

implemented, but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this final

summing up.Trials

3.

Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the

Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional

incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their duties and

physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and

resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation’s

demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future

recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war. We accordingly

recommend that the following trials be undertaken without delay.

(I) That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen.

Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a

criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if

necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to

influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both

for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading

some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to

attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of

March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East

Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and

subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of

Pakistan:

(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (I) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in

the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect would

be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war

(iii) That Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, former Commander 1 Corps, be tried for criminal and

wilful neglect of duty in conducting the operations of his Corps in such a manner that nearly 500

villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan were surrendered to the

enemy without a light and as a consequence the Army offensive in the south was seriously

jeopardised;

(iv) That Maj Gen Abid Zahid, former GOC 15 Div, be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful

surrender of a large area comprising nearly 98 villages in the phuklian salient in the Sialkot

district of West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat to the safety of Marala

Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within nearly 1500 yards thereof. He also kept the GHQ

in the dark about Indian occupation of the Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after

the war.

(v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC 18 Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that

his offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area

(Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in

severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert.

(vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, former Commander, Eastern Command, be court-martialled on

15 charges as set out in Chapter III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful

neglect in the performance of his professional and military duties connected with the defence of

East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces to the Indians at a juncture when he still

had the capability and resources to offer resistance.

(vii) That Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by

court martial on five charges listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the Supplementary

Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the defence of Dacca and

showing complete Jack of courage and will to fight, in acquiescing in the decision of the

Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to

put up resistance for a period of two weeks or so, and also for wilfully neglecting to inform the

authorities concerned, on repatriation to Pakistan, about the fact of distribution of Rs.50,000 by

him out of Pakistan currency notes and toher funds at his disposal or under his control in East

Pakistan.

(viii) That Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East

Pakistan, be tried by court martial on five charges listed against him in this Report for showing

undue regard for his personal safety in abandoning his Division, his Divisional troops and area of

responsibility and Vacating his Divisional Headquarters from Chandpur on the 8th of December,

1971; for his wilful insistence on moving by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing

the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to himself

and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for his abandoning valuable signal

equipment at Chandpur; for spreading despondency and alarm by certain conversation on the

12th of December, 1971, at Dacca; and for wilfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report to

GHQ on being specially evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as to conceal the

circumstances of his desertion from him Divisional Headquarters at Chandpur.

(ix) That Brig. G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, former GOS, Eastern Command, Dacca, be tried by court

martial on nine charges as formulated in this Report, for his wilful neglect of duty in advising the

Commander, Eastern Command, as regards the concept and formulation of defence plans,

appreciation of the Indian threat, execution of denial plans, abrupt changes in command,

friendliness with he Indian during captivity and attempts to influence formation Commanders by

threats and inducements to present a co-ordinated story before the GHQ and the Commission

of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East Pakistan.

(x) That Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Commander 107 Brigade, 9 Division, East Pakistan, be

tried by court martial on four charges for displaying wilful neglect in not formulating a sound plan

for the defence of the fortress of Jesore; for failing to properly plan and command the brigade

counter-attack at Gharibpur, for shamefully abandoning the fortress of Jessor and delivering

intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps; and disobeying the orders of the GOC

9 Divison, to withdraw to Magura in the event of a forced withdrawal from Jessore;

(xi) That Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi, former commander 53 Brigade, 39 (ad-hoc) Division,

East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on six charges for displaying culpable lack of initiative,

determination and planning ability in that he failed to occupy and prepare defences at

Mudafarganj as ordered by his GOC on the 4th of December, 1971; for failing to eject the enemy

from Mudafarganj as ordered on the 6th of December, 1971; for shamefully abandoning the

fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December, 1971; for wilful neglect in failing to

properly organise oxfiltration of his troops from the fortress of Laksham to Comilla on the 9th of

December, 1971, thus resulting in heavy casualties and capture of several elements of his

troops on the way; for showing callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksham

124 sick and wounded with two Medical Officers without informing them about the proposed

vacation of the fortress; and for abandoning intact at Laksham all heavy weapons, stocks of

ammunition and supplies for the use of the enemy;

II. Inquiry and Trials for Alleged AtrocitiesThat as recommended in Paragraph 7 of Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report and in

4.

Paragraph 39 of Chapter II of Part V of this Supplementary Report, a high-powered Court or

Commission of Inquiry be set up to investigate into persistent allegations of atrocities said to

have been committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan during its operations from March

to December, 1971, and to hold trials of those who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad

name to the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies of the local population by their acts of

wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people. The composition of the Court of Inquiry,

if not its proceedings, should be publicly announced so as to satisfy national conscience and

international opinion. The Commission feels that sufficient evidence is now available in Pakistan

for a fruitful inquiry to be undertaken in this regard. As the Government of Bangladesh has since

been recognised by Pakistan, it may also be feasible to request the Dacca authorities to

forward to this Court of Inquiry whatever evidence may be available with them.

III. Other Inquiries(I) That allegations of personal immorality, drunkenness and indulgence in corrupt practices

5

against General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan and Maj. Gen Khuda Dad Khan be

properly investigated as there is prima facie evidence to show that their moral degeneration

resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence. In the light of the result of this

inquiry suitable charges may be added against these Officers, during the trials we have already

recommended earlier. The details of the allegations and the evidence relating thereto will be

found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report.

(ii) That similar allegations of personal immorality, acquiring a notorious reputation in this behalf

at Sialkot, Lahore and Dacca, and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan from East to West

Pakistan made against Lt. Gen Niazi should also be inquired into and, if necessary, made the

subject matter of additional charges at the trial earlier recommended in respect of the

performance of his professional duties in East Pakistan. The details of these allegations and

the evidence relating thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report and in

Chapter I of part V of this supplementary Report.

(iii) That an inquiry is also indicated into the disposal of Rs.50, 000 said to have been distributed

by Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division and Director General,

East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces immediately before the surrender on the 16th of December

1971. Details of this matter including the General’s explanation would be found in Paras 21 to

23 of Chapter I of Part V of the Supplementary Report. We have already recommended that this

Officer be tried by a court martial on several charges including his wilful failure to disclose any

facts at all about his sum Rs.50,000. That charge does not necessarily imply any dishonest

practice on his part. The inquiry now suggested can form a part of the charges already

recommended.

(iv) That allegations of indulging in large-scale looting of property in East Pakistan including theft

of Rs.1, 35,00,000 from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Ganj persistently made against

Brig. Jehanazeb Arbab, former Commander 57 Brigade, Lt Col (now Brig) Muzaffar Ali Zahid,

former CO 31 Field Regiment, Lt. Col Basharat Ahmad, former CO 18 Punjab, Lt. Col

Mohammad Taj, former CO 32 Punjab, Lt Col Mohammad Tufail, former CO 55 Field Regiment

and Major Madad Hussain Shah of 18 Punjab, as set out in Paras 24 and 25 of Chapter I of part

V of the Supplementary Report, should be thoroughly inquired into and suitable action taken in

the light of the proved facts.

(v) That an inquiry be held into the allegation, noticed by us in Para 36 of Chapter 1 of Part V of

the Main Report, that while serving in the Martial Law Administration at Multan, Maj. Gen.

Jahanzeb, presumably a Brigadier at that time, demanded a bribe of Rs. one lac from a PCS

Officer posted as Chairman of the Municipal Committee of Multan, on pain of proceeding against

him for corruption under martial Law, as a consequence of which demand the said PCS Officer

is said to have committed suicide leaving behind a letter saying that although he had made only

Rs.15,000 he was being required to pay Rs. one lac to the Martial Law officers. The allegation

was made before the Commission by Brig. Mohammad Abbas Beg (Witness No.9)

(vi) That in inquiry is also necessary into the allegation made against Brig. Hayatullah that he

entertained some wom en in his bunker in the Maqbulpur sector (West Pakistan) on the night of

the 11th or 12th of December, 1971, when Indian shells were falling on his troops. The

allegation was contained in an anonymous letter addressed to the Commission and supported

in evidence before us by the Brigadier Hayatullah’s brigade, Major, namely, Major Munawar

Khan (Witness No.42).

(vii) That it is necessary to investigate into the allegations, as set out in Paragraphs 9 to 14 of

Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report, to the effect that senior Army Commanders grossly

abused their official position and powers under the Martial Law to acquire large allotments of

land, and obtained substantial house buildings loans on extremely generous terms from certain

banking institutions with which they deposited large amounts from departmental funds entrusted

to their care. Those found guilty of corrupt practices should receive the punishment they

deserve under the military law or the ordinary criminal law of the land as the case may be.

(viii) That a thorough investigation be conducted into the suspicion created in the mind of the

Commission, during the recording of additional evidence of Officers repatriated form India, that

there may be some complicity or collusion between the Commander, Easter Command (Lt Gen

A.A.K. Niazi) and his Chief of Staff (Brig G.M. Baqir Saddiqui) on the one hand and the Indian

authorities on the other in the matter of the failure of the Pakistan Armed Forces to carry out

execution of denial plans immediately before the surrender inspite of instructions issued in this

behalf by GHQ on the 10th of December, 1971. We have already included relevant charges in

this behalf against these two Officers, but we consider that it would be in the public interest to

depute a specialized agency to probe into the matter further. On the material available to us we

cannot put the matter higher than suspicion, but we have not been able to find any reasonable,

or even plausible explanation for the orders issued by the Easter Command to stop the

execution of denial plans, particularly in Dacc and Chittagong, thus ensuring the delivery intact

to the Indians of large amounts of war materials and other equipment. Details of these deliveries

will be found in our Chapter VII of Part IV dealing with the aftermath of surrender.

(ix) That an inquiry be held into the circumstances under which Commander Gul Zareen of the

Pakistan Navy was carried from Khulna to Singapore on the 7th of December, 1971, by a

French ship called M.V. Fortescue, thus abandoning his duties at PNS Titumir Naval Base,

Khulna. The case of this Officer was dealt with by us in Paras 12 and 13 of Chapter III of Part V

of the Main Report.

IV. Cases Requiring Departmental ActionWhile examining the course of events and the conduct of war in East Pakistan, we formed a

6.

poor opinion about the performance and capabilities of Brig. S.A.Ansari, ex-Commander 23

Brigade, Brig. Manzoor Ahmad, ex -Commander 57 Brigade, 9 Division, and Brig Abdul Qadir

Khan, ex -Commander 94 brigade, 36 (ad hoc) Division. We consider that their further retention

in service is not in the public interest and they may accordingly be retired.

V. Performance and Conduct of Junior OfficersIn the very nature of things the Commission was not in a position to examine at any length

7.

the conduct and performance of officers below the brigade level, although some case

necessarily came to our notice where the performance of these Officers had a direct bearing on

the fate of important battles or where their conduct transgressed the norms of discipline. Such

cases have been mentioned by us at their proper place, but by and large cases of junior Officers

must be dealt with by the respective service headquarters who have obtained detailed debriefing

reports from all of them and are also in possession of the assessment of their performance by

their immediate superiors.

VI. Measures for Moral Reform in the Armed ForcesWhile dealing at some length with the moral aspect of the 1971 debacle, in Chapter I of Part

8.

V of the Main Report as well as in the corresponding Chapter of the present Supplementary

Report, we have expressed the opinion that there is indeed substance in the widespread

allegation, rather belief, that due to corruption arising out of the performance of Martial Law

duties, lust for wine and women, and greed for lands and houses a large number of senior Army

Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but

also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded

of them for the successful prosecution of the war. Accordingly, we recommend that: –

(I) The Government should call upon all Officers of the Armed Forces to submit declarations of

their assets, both moveable and immovable, and those acquired in the names of their relations

and dependents during the last ten years (they were exempted from submitting such

declarations during the last two periods of martial Law). If on examination of such declarations

any Officer is found to have acquired assets beyond this known means, then appropriate action

should be taken against him

(ii) The Armed Services should devise ways and means to ensure: –

(a) That moral values are not allowed to be compromised by infamous behaviour particularly at

higher levels

(b) That moral rectitude is given due weight along with professional qualities in the matter of

promotion to higher ranks;

(c) That syllabi of academic studies at the military academics and other Service Institutions

should include courses designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious

democratic and political institutions

(d) That use of alcoholic drinks should be banned in military messes and functions

(e) That serious notice should be taken of notorious sexual behaviour and other corrupt

practices

VII. Discipline and Terms and Conditions of Service9.

reasons given therein we make the following recommendations: –

(I) An inter-services study should be undertaken of the operative terms and conditions of service

and amenities available to Officers, JCOs and other ranks of the Services so as to remove

disparities existing in this behalf and causing discontentment among the junior officers and

other ranks of various Services

(ii) The GHQ should consider the advisability of adopting recommendations contained in the

report submitted by the Discipline Committee headed by the late Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan Janjua

(iii) Th e Navy and Air Force might also appoint their own Discipline Committees to consider the

peculiar problems of their Services, such measure to be in addition to the inter-services study

recommended above.

VIII. Improvement and Modernizations of the Pakistan Navy10.

VIII of Part IV of the Main Report, and supplemented by further details of its operations in East

Pakistan is set out in this Supplementary Report, it seems to us that the following steps are

urgently called for to improve our naval capability: –

(I) That immediate attention should be given to he basic requirements for the modernizations of

the Pakistan Navy in order to make it capable of protecting the only sea port of Pakistan and of

keeping the life-lines of the nation open. The Navy has been sadly neglected ever since the first

Martial Law regime, for in the concept of Army Commander the Navy was not expected to play

much of a role. The folly of this theory was fully demonstrated during this war. The Pakistan

Navy, we strongly recommend, should have its own air arm of suitable aircraft for the purpose of

reconnaissance and for defence against missile boats. This is the only way in which the threat

posed by the growing Indian Navy and her missible boats can be countered.

(ii) There is urgent need for developing a separate harbour for the Navy away from Karachi, from

where the Navy can protect the approaches to Karachi more effectively

(iii) In view of the serious handicaps which were posed by the late conveyance of the D-day and

the H-hour to the Pakistan Navy and its total exclusion from he planning for war, the need for

making the Navy a fully operative member in he joint Chiefs of Staff Organization is imperative.

IX. Improvement in the Role of P.A.F.11. In Section (C) of Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report as well as in a separate Chapter

of the present supplement (viz Chapter X of Part III), we have discussed at length the role and

performance of the P.A.F. in the 1971 war. In the light of that discussion, we recommend as

follows: –

(I) We are not convinced that a more forward-looking posture cannot be adopted by eh Air Force

having regard to the peculiar needs of the country. We recommend, therefore, that Pakistan

should have more forward air fields located at such places from where it might be in a position to

give more protection to our vital line of communication as well as to major centres of industry.

The adoption of such a fo rward strategy would also increase the striking capabilities of our

fighters.

(ii) There is need also to improve the working of our early warning system. The time lag

between the observation of an enemy aircraft by the first line of Mobile Observer Units and the

final collation of that information in the Air Operation Centre takes unduly long because of the

draftory system of reporting adopted. Training exercises to coordinate the working of the various

agencies employed for the operation of the early warning system should be held periodically to

keep them at a high pitch of efficiency.

(iii) The Karachi Port should also be provided as soon as possible, with a low level seawardlooking

radar which it seriously lacks and due to the want of which it suffered many handicaps

during the last war.

(iv) That with the increased Indian capability of blockading Karachi with missile boats the air

defence of Karachi should be attached greater importance. Leaving the defence of Karachi to be

tackled only by one squadron of fighters and a half squadron of bombers was extremely unwise.

X. Re-organization of Air Defence of Pakistan12. The subject of air defence has been discussed by us at some length in section (13) of

Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report. In the light of that discussion, we make the following

recommendations: –

(a) Since it will not be possible for us to enlarge our Air Force to any appreciable extent in the

near future, we strongly recommend that we should strengthen our air defence programmes by

at least doubling our holdings of anti-craft guns by the end of 1972 and ultimately raising it under

a phased programme to 342 Batteries as suggested by the Air Force.

(b) Efforts should also be made to procure ground to air missiles for a more effective air defence

of the country.

(c) If ground-to-air missiles are not available, then efforts should also be made to get radar

controlled medium HAA guns from China.

XI. Recommendations with Regard to Civil Defence Measures13.

consider that the following measures are called for to improve the civil defence aspects in

Pakistan: –

(a) The civil defence arrangements should be placed under the Ministry of Defence, and not be

made the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior or other individual departments. The Central

Government should accept the responsibility for the overall control and organization of the civil

defence of the country, as Provincial Governments have not been able to shoulder this

responsibility effectively in the past.

(b) Steps should be taken to improve the fire-fighting facilities in the country, particularly in ports

and industrial areas.

(c) Industrialists keeping inflammable materials near lines of communications and other

vulnerable points should be induce, or in fact obliged under the law, to accept responsibility for

the protection of their materials, and make effective arrangements for fire-fighting in their

establishments.

(d) Provision should be made for storing large quantitative of petrol and other fuels underground.

XII. Higher Direction of War14.

Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main Report, and in the light of that discussion, we proposed the

following measures: –

(a) The three Service Headquarters should be located at one place along with the Ministry of

Defence.

(b) The posts of Commander-in-Chiefs should be replaced by Chiefs of Staff of the respective

services (This, we understand, has already been done by the Government)/

(c) The Defence Committee of the Cabinet should be re-activated and it should be ensured that

its meetings are held regularly. A positive direction should be added in its Charter to give the

Cabinet Division the right to initiate proceedings for the convening of its meetings should be held

even in the absence of the President or the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of the senior

most minister present.

(d) There should also be a Defence Ministers Committee and the Ministry of Defence should

assume its rightful position as a policy-making body and incorporating policy, decisions into

defence programmes after consultations with the three services. This should ensure the

preparations of realistic plans for the national defence with in the agreed framework of …….

allocations. It should meet under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister and comprise the

Defence Secretary, the three service chiefs, the financial advi ser for defence, the Director

General of Civil Defence, the Director General of munitions production, the Director General of

Defence Procurement, the Director General of inter-services Intelligence Directorate, the

Defence Scientific Adviser and any other Central Secretary or Service officer who may be

required for a particular item on agenda. If the defence portfolio is held by the President or the

Prime Minister then its meeting may be presided over by a Deputy Minister for or by the

Minister in charge of Defence Production (illegible) Minister is available, the Defence Secretary

should preside, irrespective of any considerations of protocol or (illegible)

(e) The Secretaries Coordination Committee as at present constituted, should continue

(f) (illegible) The three services should share (illegible) joint responsibility for national defence

and that all plans and programmes for the development of the (illegible) forces should be based

on joint (illegible) objectives, it is necessary. Therefore, that the three services Chief should

(illegible) As Joint Chiefs of Staff and not merely as individual Heads of their respective Services.

This Joint Chiefs or Staff should constitute a corporate body with collective responsibility having

its own (illegible) staff for evolving joint plans and its own Headquarters located on one place.

The (illegible) of chairman of this Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held by rotation, irrespective of the

personal ranks enjoyed by the three service chiefs. The duration of the tenure should be one

year at a time and the chairmanship should commence with the (illegible) Service, mainly, the

Army. A detailed Chapter of duties for this Joint Chiefs of Staff has been suggested in Annexure

‘I’ of Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main report.

(g) Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organisation there will not only by a Secretariat but also a

joint planning staff drawn from all the three Services. It might be designed as the Joint

Secretariat and Planning Staff. It will be responsible not only for providing the necessary

secretarial assistance (illegible) Also for evolving the joint defence plans and (illegible) studies

of processing of all matters of inter-(illegible) The Joint Chief of Staff may also have other Joint

Common to assist them on such matters, as it may consider necessary.

(h) The weakness, in the (illegible) of the armed forces, which have been brought by light,

(illegible) feel that there is need for an institution like the America” (illegible) General’ which

should be a body changed was the duty of carrying out surprise inspection and calling area the

formations and (illegible) concerned to demonstrate that the (illegible)

(this para not readable)

(i) We have also felt the (illegible) for in Institute of Strategic Studies, preferably as a part of a

University Programme. The need for such an (illegible) has been highlighted by the weakness in

our joint strategic panning by the three Services. We are of the opinion that such an Institute will

go a long way in producing studies of value for examination by the other defence organizations.

XIII National Security CouncilHaving examined the working of the National Security Council in Chapter XI of Part IV of the

15.

Main Report we are of the opinion that there is no need for super-(illegible) such an organization

on the Directorate of Intelligence Bureau and the Directorate of Inter-services Intelligence. The

Security Council should therefore be abolished.

XIV. The Farman Ali incidentIn view of the fresh evidence examined by us regarding the role of Maj Gen Farman Ali,

16.

which we have discussed in the concluding portion of Chapter III of Part V of the Supplementary

Report, recommendation No. 7 made in the Main Report has now become (illegible); as we have

found that in delivering a message to Mr. Paul Mare Henry, Assistant Secretary General of the

United Nations. Maj Gen Farman Ali, acted under the instructions of the Governor of East

Pakistan, who in turn had been authorised by the then President of Pakistan to make certain

proposals for settlement in East Pakistan at the critical juncture.

 

Silence is sin! | Imran leads protest against Aitzaz’s detention—>The post

LAHORE: To express solidarity with deposed judges, detained jurists and pay tribute to their historic struggle, a rally was held outside Atizaz Ahsan’s House on Sunday.

Starting from the Zman park residence of Aitzaz, the rally which was led by PTI Chief Imran Khan, reached The Mall before coming back.

As many as 200 people from different walks of life including lawyers, students, political workers teachers businessmen and civil society activist demonstrated against Musharraf.

Nasra Javed Iqbal,Vena Malik, Dr.Farid, Faryal Gohar, Ahsen Rashid Hamid Zaman Azher and Hamid khan were present.

They shouted ; Mushraf ki barbadi Tak Jang rahi gi jang rahi gi. They carried banner reading “Pakistan Ki Baqa, Azad Adliya Expressing the rally Bushra Atizaz insisted that judiciary must be restored then we can experience the true and strong democracy .She feared if it was not so the country would come on the threshold of destruction.

Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf Chairman Imran Khan said that country has to choose the Quaid’s Pakistan. He vowed “we will stand with deposed judges and detained lawyers for the bright future of Pakistan”. Imran indicated that weak judiciary is not good omen not only for political parties but also to the government institutions. He said PEMRA ordinance is totally against the freedom of press. The parliament should restore the sacked judges, he added.

“The winning political parties PPP, PML (Nawaz) and ANP should reinstate the removed judges of the superior courts. Pakistan can win war against terrorism provided the real democracy is allowed to work and the country put on the right track of democracy. The country will remain in the dark if the sacked judges were not restored”, says Imran Khan while addressing demonstrators outside Aitzaz’s house. Meanwhile police on Sunday did not allow Aitzaz to come out.

United4Justice: I think the pressure should be maintained on the government and also a clear message should be given to the elected parties that if they deviate from thier agenda they will face the same opposition as Musharraf is facing.

Keep it UP!

Retired generals refuse to apologise,but want Musharraf to go—>The News

ISLAMABAD: Several hundred retired armed forces men on Thursday urged their colleague, General (retd) Pervez Musharraf, to hand over power to the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and join their ranks but most of their leaders refused to apologise for their past roles against democracy.

Led by some high-profile generals, air marshals and admirals, these ex-servicemen also demanded that retired Justice Bhagwandas be appointed as the Chief Election Commissioner and the detained nuclear scientist, Dr AQ Khan, be either released or tried in a court.

Except for retired Lt-Gen Hamid Gul, none of the leaders showed moral courage by making an admission of guilt or apologising to the nation for their past. They did not even feel any embarrassment on their roles when asked by newsmen at a press conference.

The former DG of ISI, Lt-Gen (retd) Hamid Gul, not only admitted the wrongdoings he had committed as a spy chief, he also submitted an apology to the nation and said he was ready for any punishment, even to be hanged.

“I am ready for a trial or even hanging,” Gul told the gathering of ex-servicemen in open door proceedings. His words, however, failed to move the other architects and supporters of martial law who were sitting on the stage. They included retired Lt-Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Lt-Gen Majid Malik and Lt-Gen Asad Durrani. They showed no remorse for their past conduct.

Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who awas presiding over the meeting, was annoyed when he was asked about his past role and whether he was ready to apologise. “These were individual acts of different individuals,” he responded.

He did not respond when a journalist questioned their moral authority to preach others when they did not feel embarrassed on the wrongdoings of their past. The convener of Thursday’s meeting, Brig (retd) Mehmood, who had said only a day earlier that he would offer an apology on behalf of all the ex-servicemen, remained seated on the stage with his head down, as if trying to avoid the media and had no courage to act on his words.

Although, the retired servicemen expressed solidarity with lawyers and journalists community, vowing to participate in their rallies, they gave no timeframe for launching a movement against Musharraf on their own. They instead said nothing had been decided as yet.

They even conceded that they might not do anything concrete in future. Asghar Khan said many of them had their near and dear ones in the government, a major hurdle in their way to call the spade a spade. Asghar Khan’s own brother, Farooq Rehmatullah, is the DG Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).

A demand raised by a retired navy commodore, Shahid Nawaz, also went unheeded. He had asked for en masse resignations of all ex-servicemen presently working in government departments. “If this strategy is not feasible, then out-of-job ex-servicemen should surrender all medals, awards and pension books to protest against Musharraf’s stay in power,” he demanded, but this demand also went unheard by the retired generals.

The Thursday’s meeting virtually turned into a comedy programme as it was marred by indiscipline largely by ex-servicemen, who would pick up quarrel with journalists when questions regarding their own accountability were put to the Chair Asghar Khan.

However, they did at least one job by hooting down a proposal that Lt-Gen (retd) Abdul Majeed Malik should be included in the committee that was to make a list of demands of Thursday’s meeting during the lunch break.

Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who was chairing the meeting, told a press briefing that ex-servicemen demanded stepping down of President Musharraf and that power should be handed over to the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry to hold elections under a neutral caretaker set-up.

Khan also demanded the re-constitution of the Election Commission of Pakistan with Justice Bhagwandas as its chief. Khan said the ex-servicemen would extend full support to the protest rallies staged by journalists and lawyers. The meeting demanded that disgraced hero, Dr AQ Khan, should be either released or tried in a court of law, instead of being kept under illegal detention.

Khan, however, remained uncomfortable while facing critical journalists with his colleagues sitting in the hall, yelling ‘planted question’ whenever a query about their accountability was put to him.

In most cases, he said: “We have not decided yet”. He refused to take questions on self-accountability and was pressed time and again that he himself was among the strong supporters of General Zia’s martial law and the person sitting next to him, Lt-Gen (retd) Faiz Ali Chishti, was Commander 10 Corps when Zia had taken over and later collaborated with him in all his acts.

Questioners also mentioned Gen (retd) Beg under whose stint as Army chief the Mehran Bank scandal took place and the then president had nominated his successor three months before Beg’s retirement as a pre-emptive measure keeping in view his political ambitions.

But neither Asghar Khan showed the grace to admit any wrongdoing nor did Chishti and Beg. Speaking on his own behalf and the two others, Khan said: “Whatever happened in the past has happened. There were individuals involved, not all ex-servicemen.”

Lt-Gen. (retd) Abdul Majid Malik, who spoke earlier, said many blunders were committed in the past but regretted that only the blunders committed by the Army had been exploited. Malik left the venue before the press conference when the majority of those present said ‘no’ to the proposal of nominating him as a committee member for furnishing the list of demands.

United4Justice: Its great to see our soldiers (a soldiers remains a soldier for life unless he becomes a dictator) back in the field (this time the right way and for the right cause) to save the country from a dictator.

KEEP IT UP!