Archive
Swat and Extremism
Swat is a good example to see how extremism develops. In 2006 I went to the area with my friends. We offered prayers in mosque (belonging to Jud or Fazlullah). We had people from different sects like Shia, Sunni or non-taqleedis but no one in the mosque bothered to question our different ways of praying and everyone was normal about it.
Similarly there were tourists with different social-class backgrounds and dressed up like the way they do in Karachi, Islamabad etc and no one bothered to question their dresses. There were girls school in the area and no one bothered to blow them up. Things started to go bad in the area when Army demolished the local structure which created vacuum for these groups to take over and especially when Lal-Masjid operation was conducted (The operation itself was sectarian and social-class fascism backed) , it gave a message to the people that there ways are in danger now and so they went on to the path of extremism. Its very easy for us to consider others as evil aliens and point fingers at them but to resolve a problem, an honest analysis is required to see where it all started and where the root cause lies.
Swat, Tribal areas etc were promised that their autonomy will remain in tact if they join Pakistan but Army on various occasions from 60s violated these agreements and started to meddle in there affairs especially in Musharraf’s time they deliberately targeted their religious schools and institutions. It seems that army used this war not only to bag dollars from Americans but also to pursue their old goal of invading these tribal areas because they seem to love only that Pakistan which is under their boots otherwise they will do another Bangladesh with that part of the country like they are also doing with Baluchistan.
People are again chanting slogans for more War in North Waziristan especially after Malala Yousafzai attack. They should ask their self about the goals they have achieved after decades of military operations in FATA, Baluchistan and Swat. These operations have resulted in more extremism and more terrorism, and they are not going to give different results in the future except things will go worse.
Malala Issue, drones, NWA operation and fog of this fake war on terror
Recent events of march against drone strikes and attack on Malala Yousafzai have raised some important questions in my mind. These questions are mainly related to the timing of the event and how past events were dealt by the government and security institutions.
If Benazir Murder case is resolved then a lot can be understood about this fake war. For a start, one should ask that how was it possible that some rogue terrorists were able to delete or tempered the mobile communication record from the area? As far as I know that only ISI or some other high level intelligence organization like CIA (Like NADRA data they can surely access this data too) can do it.
These incidents like Benazir, Malala, Islamic University blast or Peshawar market blasts (denied by Talibans) happen at crucial times when anti-war protests take momentum or some crucial decisions are being made about further operations.
Another interesting event is the letter written by Afghan (Pentagon puppet) President Hamid Karzai to PTI’s Chairman, Imran Khan. For those who think that Malala issue is not related to drones and military operations or this fake war, there are few things to ponder upon (If they have the brain to do so). Why the president of a country would like to write a letter to Imran Khan and show the concerns which are shown by social-class and sectarian fascists in Pakistan and pro-imperialism media in USA? It seems Imran Khan and PTI’s march against drone strikes not only disturbed the plans of Pakistani sectarian and social-class fascists but also disturbed the pro-war scum internationally.
Another thing to understand about drone, NWA operation and Malala issue is that Imran Khan is scheduled to lead a protest in front of UN on 26th October 2012.
We need to find answers for these questions. For a start on Malala’s issue, government’s own interior minister Rehman Malik denied the involvement of TTP. Even if it is TTP then there are more than 15 (some say 30) groups working as TTP.
Some are fighting for revenge, some are being funded by international enemies of the country who want Pakistan to remain stuck in this war and some are local criminal gangs. Unless they are not identified clearly, word Taliban has no meaning. Free and Fair investigation can only be done in current scenario through Supreme Court or some investigation body working under SC. But again judiciary is being badly cornered by the government and army due to corruption and missing persons cases. That is why I say for a start we need to find the names behind Benazir murder case.
People say that these tribes and terrorists are ideologically connected. Ideologically connected is also a vague term. People with same customs, cultures or grievances or may be some other common points can be termed as ideologically connected. With this logic most Indians can be termed as RSS, most USA can be connected to Bund or KKK, all Irish people can be termed as IRA, all British people can blamed for the crimes of East India Company, most Israelis can be linked with Stern gang, most Germans can be linked with Nazis etc. Without addressing the root causes, one cannot solve this issue and waging a war against populations after some isolated incidents doesn’t look very intelligent especially after a decade of destruction.
When are we going to learn the lessons from past mistakes? Or Pakistan army and government are committed to repeat another 1971?
Sheikh Mujeeb ki Na mukammil Yaddashtain–> A good column by Hamid Mir in Jang
A good article by hamid mir on Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Source :
http://e.jang.com.pk/pic.asp?npic=07-30-2012%2FLahore%2Fimages%2F06_04.gif
Myanmar raises death toll from clashes –>Disturbing news from Myanmar
It is not unexpected to see tyranny in a country ruled by dictators. But situation in Myanmar is getting worse day by day. Muslim minority in Myanmar are suffering badly from certain groups fueling racism and religion base riots. Human rights associations and justice loving people should raise their voice on the worsening situation in Myanmar.
Myanmar raises death toll from clashes
State media says 50 people killed and thousands more displaced by clashes between Rakhine Budhists and Rohingya Muslims.
Source:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/06/201261692224258958.html
Myanmar’s state media says the death toll has gone up to 50 in ethnic clashes in the western state of Rakhine, as the UN warned of “immense hardship” faced by thousands displaced by rioting.
The New Light of Myanmar newspaper said on Saturday that 54 other people were injured and 2,230 houses and buildings were destroyed by fire during the clashes between Rakhine Budhists and Rohingya Muslims.
The report did not say whether the updated toll included 10 Muslims beaten to death on June 3 by a Buddhist mob in apparent revenge for the rape and murder of a Rakhine woman, which sparked the violence.
The violence was a result of long-standing tensions between the ethnic Rakhine community and the minority Rohingya, whom many Rakhines regard as illegal immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh.
The Rohingya say they have lived in the region for decades.
A senior state official said on Thursday that 29 people had been killed, but rights groups and other local sources believe the real figure could be much higher, as there was hardly any information from the remote villages.
Despite the apparent cessation of violence, the area still faces a humanitarian crisis because of the numbers of displaced people.
Thousands displaced
Nearly 32,000 people from both sides are being housed in camps across Rakhine, officials in the capital, Sittwe said on Thursday, after thousands of homes were set ablaze.
Unknown numbers of Rohingya have also tried to flee to Bangladesh, but the authorities there have barred their entry.
A UN team witnessed the devastation on a two-day visit to the region, saying that about 10,000 displaced people, both Rakhine and Rohingya, were sheltering in Sittwe alone.
Pledging help for the affected area, UN special adviser Vijay Nambiar praised the government for its “prompt, firm and sensitive” response to the clashes but urged a “full, impartial and credible” probe into the unrest.
Sittwe, a port city and the region’s main urban centre, was calm for the fourth straight day, though many shops and markets remained closed and people were still fearful of further arson attacks.
Soldiers were sent to help quell the violence and when the situation spread to Sittwe, President Thein Sein declared a state of emergency, giving the military full administrative powers to keep order.
Myanmar’s government doesn’t consider the country’s about 800,000 Rohingya Muslims as citizens, thereby rendering them stateless and unable to access to education, health and social security.
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Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report Conclusion–>Need to revisit the past
Another 16 December is here and I don’t think much lessons are learned from a disaster which could have made any nation with some conscience to think over its strategies. Still our military establishment is involved in dirty politics, working for imperialist agenda and busy in securing their business agenda. Our establishment and politicians have not learned much lessons and are still busy in following unjust practices, suppression and killing of own people to please their masters and fulfil their greed.
“Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.” – Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on 1971
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Recommendations below are taken from the Supplementary report issued by Hamood ur Rehman Commission which was setup to investigate the events in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
There are parts which are missing as the report is never officially released and it was published by some indian media.
Full Supplementary Report can be downloaded from here :
http://www.insaf.pk/Portals/0/NTForums_Attach/hamoodurrehmancommission-report.pdf
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the concluding portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had made a number of
recommendations based on our study of the various aspects of the causes of the debacle of
1971. Some of these recommendations need to be modified, or amplified, in the light of the fresh
evidence, which we have now recorded: while the need for the others has only been further
emphasised, we believe that the object of setting up this Commission would be fully realised
only if appropriate and early action is taken by the Government on these recommendations.2.
consider that it would be appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally set out at one
place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed reasons and justification for these
recommendations will be found in the relevant Chapters of the Main Report as well as this
Supplementary Report. We are aware that some of these recommendations have already been
implemented, but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this final
summing up.Trials
3.
Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the
Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional
incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their duties and
physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and
resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation’s
demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future
recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war. We accordingly
recommend that the following trials be undertaken without delay.
(I) That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen.
Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a
criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if
necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to
influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both
for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading
some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to
attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of
March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East
Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and
subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of
Pakistan:
(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (I) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in
the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect would
be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war
(iii) That Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, former Commander 1 Corps, be tried for criminal and
wilful neglect of duty in conducting the operations of his Corps in such a manner that nearly 500
villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan were surrendered to the
enemy without a light and as a consequence the Army offensive in the south was seriously
jeopardised;
(iv) That Maj Gen Abid Zahid, former GOC 15 Div, be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful
surrender of a large area comprising nearly 98 villages in the phuklian salient in the Sialkot
district of West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat to the safety of Marala
Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within nearly 1500 yards thereof. He also kept the GHQ
in the dark about Indian occupation of the Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after
the war.
(v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC 18 Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that
his offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area
(Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in
severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert.
(vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, former Commander, Eastern Command, be court-martialled on
15 charges as set out in Chapter III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful
neglect in the performance of his professional and military duties connected with the defence of
East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces to the Indians at a juncture when he still
had the capability and resources to offer resistance.
(vii) That Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by
court martial on five charges listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the Supplementary
Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the defence of Dacca and
showing complete Jack of courage and will to fight, in acquiescing in the decision of the
Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to
put up resistance for a period of two weeks or so, and also for wilfully neglecting to inform the
authorities concerned, on repatriation to Pakistan, about the fact of distribution of Rs.50,000 by
him out of Pakistan currency notes and toher funds at his disposal or under his control in East
Pakistan.
(viii) That Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East
Pakistan, be tried by court martial on five charges listed against him in this Report for showing
undue regard for his personal safety in abandoning his Division, his Divisional troops and area of
responsibility and Vacating his Divisional Headquarters from Chandpur on the 8th of December,
1971; for his wilful insistence on moving by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing
the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to himself
and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for his abandoning valuable signal
equipment at Chandpur; for spreading despondency and alarm by certain conversation on the
12th of December, 1971, at Dacca; and for wilfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report to
GHQ on being specially evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as to conceal the
circumstances of his desertion from him Divisional Headquarters at Chandpur.
(ix) That Brig. G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, former GOS, Eastern Command, Dacca, be tried by court
martial on nine charges as formulated in this Report, for his wilful neglect of duty in advising the
Commander, Eastern Command, as regards the concept and formulation of defence plans,
appreciation of the Indian threat, execution of denial plans, abrupt changes in command,
friendliness with he Indian during captivity and attempts to influence formation Commanders by
threats and inducements to present a co-ordinated story before the GHQ and the Commission
of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East Pakistan.
(x) That Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Commander 107 Brigade, 9 Division, East Pakistan, be
tried by court martial on four charges for displaying wilful neglect in not formulating a sound plan
for the defence of the fortress of Jesore; for failing to properly plan and command the brigade
counter-attack at Gharibpur, for shamefully abandoning the fortress of Jessor and delivering
intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps; and disobeying the orders of the GOC
9 Divison, to withdraw to Magura in the event of a forced withdrawal from Jessore;
(xi) That Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi, former commander 53 Brigade, 39 (ad-hoc) Division,
East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on six charges for displaying culpable lack of initiative,
determination and planning ability in that he failed to occupy and prepare defences at
Mudafarganj as ordered by his GOC on the 4th of December, 1971; for failing to eject the enemy
from Mudafarganj as ordered on the 6th of December, 1971; for shamefully abandoning the
fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December, 1971; for wilful neglect in failing to
properly organise oxfiltration of his troops from the fortress of Laksham to Comilla on the 9th of
December, 1971, thus resulting in heavy casualties and capture of several elements of his
troops on the way; for showing callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksham
124 sick and wounded with two Medical Officers without informing them about the proposed
vacation of the fortress; and for abandoning intact at Laksham all heavy weapons, stocks of
ammunition and supplies for the use of the enemy;
II. Inquiry and Trials for Alleged AtrocitiesThat as recommended in Paragraph 7 of Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report and in
4.
Paragraph 39 of Chapter II of Part V of this Supplementary Report, a high-powered Court or
Commission of Inquiry be set up to investigate into persistent allegations of atrocities said to
have been committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan during its operations from March
to December, 1971, and to hold trials of those who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad
name to the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies of the local population by their acts of
wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people. The composition of the Court of Inquiry,
if not its proceedings, should be publicly announced so as to satisfy national conscience and
international opinion. The Commission feels that sufficient evidence is now available in Pakistan
for a fruitful inquiry to be undertaken in this regard. As the Government of Bangladesh has since
been recognised by Pakistan, it may also be feasible to request the Dacca authorities to
forward to this Court of Inquiry whatever evidence may be available with them.
III. Other Inquiries(I) That allegations of personal immorality, drunkenness and indulgence in corrupt practices
5
against General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan and Maj. Gen Khuda Dad Khan be
properly investigated as there is prima facie evidence to show that their moral degeneration
resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence. In the light of the result of this
inquiry suitable charges may be added against these Officers, during the trials we have already
recommended earlier. The details of the allegations and the evidence relating thereto will be
found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report.
(ii) That similar allegations of personal immorality, acquiring a notorious reputation in this behalf
at Sialkot, Lahore and Dacca, and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan from East to West
Pakistan made against Lt. Gen Niazi should also be inquired into and, if necessary, made the
subject matter of additional charges at the trial earlier recommended in respect of the
performance of his professional duties in East Pakistan. The details of these allegations and
the evidence relating thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report and in
Chapter I of part V of this supplementary Report.
(iii) That an inquiry is also indicated into the disposal of Rs.50, 000 said to have been distributed
by Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division and Director General,
East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces immediately before the surrender on the 16th of December
1971. Details of this matter including the General’s explanation would be found in Paras 21 to
23 of Chapter I of Part V of the Supplementary Report. We have already recommended that this
Officer be tried by a court martial on several charges including his wilful failure to disclose any
facts at all about his sum Rs.50,000. That charge does not necessarily imply any dishonest
practice on his part. The inquiry now suggested can form a part of the charges already
recommended.
(iv) That allegations of indulging in large-scale looting of property in East Pakistan including theft
of Rs.1, 35,00,000 from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Ganj persistently made against
Brig. Jehanazeb Arbab, former Commander 57 Brigade, Lt Col (now Brig) Muzaffar Ali Zahid,
former CO 31 Field Regiment, Lt. Col Basharat Ahmad, former CO 18 Punjab, Lt. Col
Mohammad Taj, former CO 32 Punjab, Lt Col Mohammad Tufail, former CO 55 Field Regiment
and Major Madad Hussain Shah of 18 Punjab, as set out in Paras 24 and 25 of Chapter I of part
V of the Supplementary Report, should be thoroughly inquired into and suitable action taken in
the light of the proved facts.
(v) That an inquiry be held into the allegation, noticed by us in Para 36 of Chapter 1 of Part V of
the Main Report, that while serving in the Martial Law Administration at Multan, Maj. Gen.
Jahanzeb, presumably a Brigadier at that time, demanded a bribe of Rs. one lac from a PCS
Officer posted as Chairman of the Municipal Committee of Multan, on pain of proceeding against
him for corruption under martial Law, as a consequence of which demand the said PCS Officer
is said to have committed suicide leaving behind a letter saying that although he had made only
Rs.15,000 he was being required to pay Rs. one lac to the Martial Law officers. The allegation
was made before the Commission by Brig. Mohammad Abbas Beg (Witness No.9)
(vi) That in inquiry is also necessary into the allegation made against Brig. Hayatullah that he
entertained some wom en in his bunker in the Maqbulpur sector (West Pakistan) on the night of
the 11th or 12th of December, 1971, when Indian shells were falling on his troops. The
allegation was contained in an anonymous letter addressed to the Commission and supported
in evidence before us by the Brigadier Hayatullah’s brigade, Major, namely, Major Munawar
Khan (Witness No.42).
(vii) That it is necessary to investigate into the allegations, as set out in Paragraphs 9 to 14 of
Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report, to the effect that senior Army Commanders grossly
abused their official position and powers under the Martial Law to acquire large allotments of
land, and obtained substantial house buildings loans on extremely generous terms from certain
banking institutions with which they deposited large amounts from departmental funds entrusted
to their care. Those found guilty of corrupt practices should receive the punishment they
deserve under the military law or the ordinary criminal law of the land as the case may be.
(viii) That a thorough investigation be conducted into the suspicion created in the mind of the
Commission, during the recording of additional evidence of Officers repatriated form India, that
there may be some complicity or collusion between the Commander, Easter Command (Lt Gen
A.A.K. Niazi) and his Chief of Staff (Brig G.M. Baqir Saddiqui) on the one hand and the Indian
authorities on the other in the matter of the failure of the Pakistan Armed Forces to carry out
execution of denial plans immediately before the surrender inspite of instructions issued in this
behalf by GHQ on the 10th of December, 1971. We have already included relevant charges in
this behalf against these two Officers, but we consider that it would be in the public interest to
depute a specialized agency to probe into the matter further. On the material available to us we
cannot put the matter higher than suspicion, but we have not been able to find any reasonable,
or even plausible explanation for the orders issued by the Easter Command to stop the
execution of denial plans, particularly in Dacc and Chittagong, thus ensuring the delivery intact
to the Indians of large amounts of war materials and other equipment. Details of these deliveries
will be found in our Chapter VII of Part IV dealing with the aftermath of surrender.
(ix) That an inquiry be held into the circumstances under which Commander Gul Zareen of the
Pakistan Navy was carried from Khulna to Singapore on the 7th of December, 1971, by a
French ship called M.V. Fortescue, thus abandoning his duties at PNS Titumir Naval Base,
Khulna. The case of this Officer was dealt with by us in Paras 12 and 13 of Chapter III of Part V
of the Main Report.
IV. Cases Requiring Departmental ActionWhile examining the course of events and the conduct of war in East Pakistan, we formed a
6.
poor opinion about the performance and capabilities of Brig. S.A.Ansari, ex-Commander 23
Brigade, Brig. Manzoor Ahmad, ex -Commander 57 Brigade, 9 Division, and Brig Abdul Qadir
Khan, ex -Commander 94 brigade, 36 (ad hoc) Division. We consider that their further retention
in service is not in the public interest and they may accordingly be retired.
V. Performance and Conduct of Junior OfficersIn the very nature of things the Commission was not in a position to examine at any length
7.
the conduct and performance of officers below the brigade level, although some case
necessarily came to our notice where the performance of these Officers had a direct bearing on
the fate of important battles or where their conduct transgressed the norms of discipline. Such
cases have been mentioned by us at their proper place, but by and large cases of junior Officers
must be dealt with by the respective service headquarters who have obtained detailed debriefing
reports from all of them and are also in possession of the assessment of their performance by
their immediate superiors.
VI. Measures for Moral Reform in the Armed ForcesWhile dealing at some length with the moral aspect of the 1971 debacle, in Chapter I of Part
8.
V of the Main Report as well as in the corresponding Chapter of the present Supplementary
Report, we have expressed the opinion that there is indeed substance in the widespread
allegation, rather belief, that due to corruption arising out of the performance of Martial Law
duties, lust for wine and women, and greed for lands and houses a large number of senior Army
Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but
also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded
of them for the successful prosecution of the war. Accordingly, we recommend that: -
(I) The Government should call upon all Officers of the Armed Forces to submit declarations of
their assets, both moveable and immovable, and those acquired in the names of their relations
and dependents during the last ten years (they were exempted from submitting such
declarations during the last two periods of martial Law). If on examination of such declarations
any Officer is found to have acquired assets beyond this known means, then appropriate action
should be taken against him
(ii) The Armed Services should devise ways and means to ensure: -
(a) That moral values are not allowed to be compromised by infamous behaviour particularly at
higher levels
(b) That moral rectitude is given due weight along with professional qualities in the matter of
promotion to higher ranks;
(c) That syllabi of academic studies at the military academics and other Service Institutions
should include courses designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious
democratic and political institutions
(d) That use of alcoholic drinks should be banned in military messes and functions
(e) That serious notice should be taken of notorious sexual behaviour and other corrupt
practices
VII. Discipline and Terms and Conditions of Service9.
reasons given therein we make the following recommendations: -
(I) An inter-services study should be undertaken of the operative terms and conditions of service
and amenities available to Officers, JCOs and other ranks of the Services so as to remove
disparities existing in this behalf and causing discontentment among the junior officers and
other ranks of various Services
(ii) The GHQ should consider the advisability of adopting recommendations contained in the
report submitted by the Discipline Committee headed by the late Maj Gen Iftikhar Khan Janjua
(iii) Th e Navy and Air Force might also appoint their own Discipline Committees to consider the
peculiar problems of their Services, such measure to be in addition to the inter-services study
recommended above.
VIII. Improvement and Modernizations of the Pakistan Navy10.
VIII of Part IV of the Main Report, and supplemented by further details of its operations in East
Pakistan is set out in this Supplementary Report, it seems to us that the following steps are
urgently called for to improve our naval capability: -
(I) That immediate attention should be given to he basic requirements for the modernizations of
the Pakistan Navy in order to make it capable of protecting the only sea port of Pakistan and of
keeping the life-lines of the nation open. The Navy has been sadly neglected ever since the first
Martial Law regime, for in the concept of Army Commander the Navy was not expected to play
much of a role. The folly of this theory was fully demonstrated during this war. The Pakistan
Navy, we strongly recommend, should have its own air arm of suitable aircraft for the purpose of
reconnaissance and for defence against missile boats. This is the only way in which the threat
posed by the growing Indian Navy and her missible boats can be countered.
(ii) There is urgent need for developing a separate harbour for the Navy away from Karachi, from
where the Navy can protect the approaches to Karachi more effectively
(iii) In view of the serious handicaps which were posed by the late conveyance of the D-day and
the H-hour to the Pakistan Navy and its total exclusion from he planning for war, the need for
making the Navy a fully operative member in he joint Chiefs of Staff Organization is imperative.
IX. Improvement in the Role of P.A.F.11. In Section (C) of Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report as well as in a separate Chapter
of the present supplement (viz Chapter X of Part III), we have discussed at length the role and
performance of the P.A.F. in the 1971 war. In the light of that discussion, we recommend as
follows: -
(I) We are not convinced that a more forward-looking posture cannot be adopted by eh Air Force
having regard to the peculiar needs of the country. We recommend, therefore, that Pakistan
should have more forward air fields located at such places from where it might be in a position to
give more protection to our vital line of communication as well as to major centres of industry.
The adoption of such a fo rward strategy would also increase the striking capabilities of our
fighters.
(ii) There is need also to improve the working of our early warning system. The time lag
between the observation of an enemy aircraft by the first line of Mobile Observer Units and the
final collation of that information in the Air Operation Centre takes unduly long because of the
draftory system of reporting adopted. Training exercises to coordinate the working of the various
agencies employed for the operation of the early warning system should be held periodically to
keep them at a high pitch of efficiency.
(iii) The Karachi Port should also be provided as soon as possible, with a low level seawardlooking
radar which it seriously lacks and due to the want of which it suffered many handicaps
during the last war.
(iv) That with the increased Indian capability of blockading Karachi with missile boats the air
defence of Karachi should be attached greater importance. Leaving the defence of Karachi to be
tackled only by one squadron of fighters and a half squadron of bombers was extremely unwise.
X. Re-organization of Air Defence of Pakistan12. The subject of air defence has been discussed by us at some length in section (13) of
Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report. In the light of that discussion, we make the following
recommendations: -
(a) Since it will not be possible for us to enlarge our Air Force to any appreciable extent in the
near future, we strongly recommend that we should strengthen our air defence programmes by
at least doubling our holdings of anti-craft guns by the end of 1972 and ultimately raising it under
a phased programme to 342 Batteries as suggested by the Air Force.
(b) Efforts should also be made to procure ground to air missiles for a more effective air defence
of the country.
(c) If ground-to-air missiles are not available, then efforts should also be made to get radar
controlled medium HAA guns from China.
XI. Recommendations with Regard to Civil Defence Measures13.
consider that the following measures are called for to improve the civil defence aspects in
Pakistan: -
(a) The civil defence arrangements should be placed under the Ministry of Defence, and not be
made the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior or other individual departments. The Central
Government should accept the responsibility for the overall control and organization of the civil
defence of the country, as Provincial Governments have not been able to shoulder this
responsibility effectively in the past.
(b) Steps should be taken to improve the fire-fighting facilities in the country, particularly in ports
and industrial areas.
(c) Industrialists keeping inflammable materials near lines of communications and other
vulnerable points should be induce, or in fact obliged under the law, to accept responsibility for
the protection of their materials, and make effective arrangements for fire-fighting in their
establishments.
(d) Provision should be made for storing large quantitative of petrol and other fuels underground.
XII. Higher Direction of War14.
Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main Report, and in the light of that discussion, we proposed the
following measures: -
(a) The three Service Headquarters should be located at one place along with the Ministry of
Defence.
(b) The posts of Commander-in-Chiefs should be replaced by Chiefs of Staff of the respective
services (This, we understand, has already been done by the Government)/
(c) The Defence Committee of the Cabinet should be re-activated and it should be ensured that
its meetings are held regularly. A positive direction should be added in its Charter to give the
Cabinet Division the right to initiate proceedings for the convening of its meetings should be held
even in the absence of the President or the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of the senior
most minister present.
(d) There should also be a Defence Ministers Committee and the Ministry of Defence should
assume its rightful position as a policy-making body and incorporating policy, decisions into
defence programmes after consultations with the three services. This should ensure the
preparations of realistic plans for the national defence with in the agreed framework of …….
allocations. It should meet under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister and comprise the
Defence Secretary, the three service chiefs, the financial advi ser for defence, the Director
General of Civil Defence, the Director General of munitions production, the Director General of
Defence Procurement, the Director General of inter-services Intelligence Directorate, the
Defence Scientific Adviser and any other Central Secretary or Service officer who may be
required for a particular item on agenda. If the defence portfolio is held by the President or the
Prime Minister then its meeting may be presided over by a Deputy Minister for or by the
Minister in charge of Defence Production (illegible) Minister is available, the Defence Secretary
should preside, irrespective of any considerations of protocol or (illegible)
(e) The Secretaries Coordination Committee as at present constituted, should continue
(f) (illegible) The three services should share (illegible) joint responsibility for national defence
and that all plans and programmes for the development of the (illegible) forces should be based
on joint (illegible) objectives, it is necessary. Therefore, that the three services Chief should
(illegible) As Joint Chiefs of Staff and not merely as individual Heads of their respective Services.
This Joint Chiefs or Staff should constitute a corporate body with collective responsibility having
its own (illegible) staff for evolving joint plans and its own Headquarters located on one place.
The (illegible) of chairman of this Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held by rotation, irrespective of the
personal ranks enjoyed by the three service chiefs. The duration of the tenure should be one
year at a time and the chairmanship should commence with the (illegible) Service, mainly, the
Army. A detailed Chapter of duties for this Joint Chiefs of Staff has been suggested in Annexure
‘I’ of Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main report.
(g) Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organisation there will not only by a Secretariat but also a
joint planning staff drawn from all the three Services. It might be designed as the Joint
Secretariat and Planning Staff. It will be responsible not only for providing the necessary
secretarial assistance (illegible) Also for evolving the joint defence plans and (illegible) studies
of processing of all matters of inter-(illegible) The Joint Chief of Staff may also have other Joint
Common to assist them on such matters, as it may consider necessary.
(h) The weakness, in the (illegible) of the armed forces, which have been brought by light,
(illegible) feel that there is need for an institution like the America” (illegible) General’ which
should be a body changed was the duty of carrying out surprise inspection and calling area the
formations and (illegible) concerned to demonstrate that the (illegible)
(this para not readable)
(i) We have also felt the (illegible) for in Institute of Strategic Studies, preferably as a part of a
University Programme. The need for such an (illegible) has been highlighted by the weakness in
our joint strategic panning by the three Services. We are of the opinion that such an Institute will
go a long way in producing studies of value for examination by the other defence organizations.
XIII National Security CouncilHaving examined the working of the National Security Council in Chapter XI of Part IV of the
15.
Main Report we are of the opinion that there is no need for super-(illegible) such an organization
on the Directorate of Intelligence Bureau and the Directorate of Inter-services Intelligence. The
Security Council should therefore be abolished.
XIV. The Farman Ali incidentIn view of the fresh evidence examined by us regarding the role of Maj Gen Farman Ali,
16.
which we have discussed in the concluding portion of Chapter III of Part V of the Supplementary
Report, recommendation No. 7 made in the Main Report has now become (illegible); as we have
found that in delivering a message to Mr. Paul Mare Henry, Assistant Secretary General of the
United Nations. Maj Gen Farman Ali, acted under the instructions of the Governor of East
Pakistan, who in turn had been authorised by the then President of Pakistan to make certain
proposals for settlement in East Pakistan at the critical juncture.
Old Games and New Challenges for Freedom and Justice Loving People
Pakistan’s political dynamics has seen its different colors over the last six decades. The country saw some of the most oppressive military regimes and also some of the most corrupt periods of elected plutocracy. Our history saw struggles between left and right and also became an active player in the cold war period.
Though our politics has been influenced strongly by the foreign masters of our ruling elites. But in that our establishment has always played a vital role either as a proxy rule for foreign powers or as a king maker in local politics, many times the role has been a mixture of both. The honest reality of our history is that this role of our establishment has seriously dented our political culture, damaged rule of law and also harmed our rights as free citizens of this country.
A country which was founded on the principles of justice and equality didn’t live up to the expectations due to the dismal performance of our establishment and their cultivated corrupt political culture based on feudal-corporatist mindsets. Right from the days of Ghulam Muhammad, Pakistani establishment strengthened its hold on the affairs of the state and its politics. Pakistan was thrown into an unwanted cold war and thus it gave up its freedom which it got few years ago into the hands of imperialist forces lead by USA, which at that time took place of United Kingdom as world super power along with its rival USSR.
Initially establishment rule was evenly balanced between civil and military establishments but later on especially after Ayub Khan martial law, military acted as the main force of establishment. Now by establishment we can easily refer to GHQ as main source of political power. Even Fatimah Jinnah, one of the strong political figure of our country and sister of founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah was not able to defeat this system. But her role in politics did make our establishment to get involved more in party politics or politics of masses. Now if I see things as an ordinary student of politics, foundation of PPP was meant to fill the political vacuum in the country so that those forces including Awami League, Jamat e Islami and others, who opposed Ayub martial law openly could not strengthen their grounds as alternate political reality other than establishment.
This approach worked in West Pakistan due to strong feudal system but failed in East Pakistan so establishment with the backing of feudal political class decided to use force on our own people. And we all know the consequences of 1971 riots and later Indo-Pak war. There was a chance for the nation to learn lessons from the mistakes and change the future course of actions.
But it didn’t happen except for few adjustments, including a real major one of developing 1973 constitution, our political outlook remained same. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was a product of establishment, who tried to become larger than he should be in the eyes of establishment and also started a nuclear program against the wishes of our imperialist masters, became a liability to the system and so he was removed from the scene through Zia martial law and later hanged till death in a murder case of controversial nature.
Removal of Bhutto, instead of giving some relief to martial law forces became counter productive especially in the province of Sind so a new political reality of MQM was given space and support by military establishment. In Zia’s time not only constitution was treated badly but his use of religion to give cover to his oppressive and hypocrite regime proved to be another major blunder in the history of our country.
Later after the death of General(R) Zia ul Haq, PPP with sympathy votes and deals with local and international establishment came into power. Instead of learning from past mistakes and doing accountability of constitutional violations and corruptions by Zia regime, PPP started a new era of corruption and nepotism in Pakistani politics. They were also joined by their rivals, PML(N) which was a product of Zia remains, in this political culture. This culture saw its ups and downs and political maneuvering by establishment through the formation of IJI and sacking of governments.
In this time Nawaz Sharif of PML(N), also emerged as a big political force through a huge mandate in 1997 elections by bagging 137 seats. Nawaz tried to undermine the unwanted reality of our political history i.e. military establishment and did not follow the line of imperialist master while conducting nuclear tests in 1998,was sacked in a military coup by General (R) Musharraf. In Nawaz’s sacking his controversial 15th amendment and attacks on judiciary also played a key role as these actions weakened the rule of law and supremacy of constitution in the country and thus giving more room for unconstitutional measures by opportunist forces of martial law.
Musharraf rule proved to be one of the most disastrous periods of Pakistani history. In this tenure Pakistan get involved into a foreign war and this war was later dragged into our cities through some of the most evil policies. This war and Musharraf’s rule converted the diversity of our society into a clash between sects, ethnicity and social classes.
Actions like attack on Supreme Judiciary, abrogation of constitution, illegal abductions, extra judicial killings, military operations including heavy bombings on civilian areas, 12 May 2007 and 9 March 2007 and others really broke the back of Pakistani economy and society. The society after Musharraf is more fragmented and country is facing some of the worst consequences of his actions.
Then another foreign sponsored deal, between forces of martial law and feudal-corporatist political elite, resulted in current NRO government. In return of Musharraf’s safety and continuation of his imperialist slave policies, current ruling alliance was not only given power but all criminal cases were removed in the name of reconciliation. In the mean time, removal of Benazir Bhutto from the scene also helped her cronies and beneficiaries of NRO deal to capture more sympathy votes. Despite a report by UN, Benazir murder case is still not seeing much progress except for cover ups.
Our history saw politics of so called Left and so called Right, so called Red and so called Green and also the so called struggle between forces of dictatorships and so called forces of democracy. The reality is most of these setups were fake and were meant to serve the goals of ruling elite and their foreign masters.
Old games are now again being played by our ruling elite with assistance from foreign masters. Former dictator Musharraf is planning to come back into politics. Pir Pagara has also started his alliance of failed politicians in the name of uniting Muslim League.
PPP and allied parties are still playing their dirty games to strengthen their rule through fear and control politics as a result a commercial hub like Karachi is seeing one of the worst periods of target killings.Institutional corruption, high inflation and a huge government-created energy crisis to pave way for their corruption in Rental Power Projects are putting us into further economic disaster.
Natural resources and assets are on sale for nothing and again our nation is being fooled just for the monetary gains of few.So called opposition comprising of PML-Q and PML-N are busy in playing their hypocritical role. People are still not able to come out of their prejudices and short term greed and so giving strength to this system through “Zindabad” mentality.
Even floods have not changed the situation much. Supreme Court, which has provided some hope after restoration is being sidelined by government and institutions. Lawyers and media which emerged as a new force in national politics are now being divided through money and threats. Government involvement in SCBA elections and threats to media are examples of this approach. Situation in Afghanistan will come with its own dynamics and impacts on Pakistani politics.
Luckily few good things happened in recent times including the revival of civil society, emergence of free and resilient media, and an independent Supreme Court. These are real challenging times for those who love freedom and justice. These include all those who are struggling for rule of law, justice, accountability, freedom and respect for nation, and above all a better Pakistan. Lot is needed to be done and it seems to be an almost impossible task but lets hope for the best as we are responsible for our actions and decisions not the given conditions and out of control realities.
Links :
Sanih e Mashriqi Pakistan–>Dr. AQ Khan on 1971 in Jang
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has written a must read thought provoking article on 1971 Independence of Bangladesh.
It seems we have not learned the lesson from our history–>16 December 1971
History teaches lots of lessons and nations which don’t learn from it often become a forgotten part of it.
Below are the words of Hamood ur Rehman commission report. The commission was made to investigate the 1971 Fall of Dhaka or Independence of Bangladesh. As Bangladesh is a sovereign state now and we wish best of luck to them on their independence day.
“Indiscriminate killing and looting could only serve the cause of the enemies of Pakistan. In the harshness, we lost the support of the silent majority of the people of East Pakistan.” Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on 1971
It seems we have not learned the lesson from our history and still repeating it in NWFP,Baluchistan and FATA.
Where I stand–>Imran Khan (The News)
Saturday, May 23, 2009
By Imran Khan
It was Goebbels who came up with the brilliant theory that if the government wanted people to follow its policy, it must first instill fear in them and then slap all dissenters with the unpatriotic card. Anyone like me, who disagrees with the current indiscriminate military operation is accused of being a Taliban apologist.
Let me state categorically that I have been against the military operations since the disaster of what was formerly the East Pakistan. From East Pakistan to the present Swat operation, the political mantra has always been “no option but the military”. Successive military operations in Balochistan have only added to the sufferings of the Baloch people, which nurtured the seeds of their disillusionment with the Pakistani state.
When Bush decided to attack Afghanistan in less than a month after 9/11, I opposed this US policy at every forum, including through the print and electronic media. Later, when he ordered the invasion of Iraq, I joined the nearly 2 million marchers in London opposing the Iraq war. It is noteworthy that at the time, over 90 per cent of Americans supported Bush’s Iraq invasion. Today, the overwhelming opinion in the US is that Iraq was a disaster. Moreover, the so-called “good war” in Afghanistan is being lost and its support dwindling.
It is not surprising to see the findings of a Rand Corporation study of the last 40 years of terrorist or asymmetric conflicts, which reveal that only 7 per cent of these conflicts were resolved through military means.
When Musharraf buckled under the US pressure and sent the Pakistan Army into Waziristan, I opposed it in parliament and through the media. Speaking to the editors, Musharraf called me a “terrorist without a beard” – as if terrorism is the sole domain of bearded folk. When the Pakistan Army was sent into Waziristan, there were no militant Taliban in Pakistan. As a result of the Army operation, the tribal social and political structure was destroyed throughout Fata and Malakand, and the vacuum has been filled by nine major militant Taliban groups.
Again, at the time Musharraf commenced military action in Balochistan I opposed it and was accused of backing the “anti-state” elements. Today, what was a movement for Baloch rights and autonomy within Pakistan has morphed into a Baloch independence movement. On opposing the Lal Masjid operation, some of the self-appointed “liberals” accused me of backing the Islamic fundamentalists. But soon most of the indefatigable crusaders for human rights joined the critics of the Lal Masjid operation. More sobering is the fact that there were 60 suicide attacks in the aftermath of the slaughter of the Lal Masjid inmates and a steep rise in extremism. The Swat flare-up is a direct consequence of the Lal Masjid operation.
While discussing my opposition to the current military operation, I must state where I stand politically and ideologically. My political inspiration is derived solely from Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the constitutionalist and democrat who believed in the rule of law above all else. My ideological moorings are firmly rooted in the political and spiritual dimensions of Allama Iqbal’s exposition of Islam, which not only liberates society from bondage but also the human soul from material desires – releasing the enormous God-given human potential.
Above all, I am an ardent follower of our Prophet’s (PBUH) example of inspiring the heart and the intellect rather than forcing ideas through the sword – a far cry from what has been happening in Swat in the name of Islam. So on no count can I possibly either support the un-Islamic acts such as beheadings, flogging of women, or forcing a way of life on others, nor am I an apologist for such people – I am only answerable on this count to my conscience and to my God.
As for my opposition to the Malakand military operation, first and foremost I believe that the military option, if it has to be used should always be a last resort. Yet in Swat, the military operation was started barely two weeks after the presidential signing of the accord without alternative political strategies being given a chance. In my opinion, a national conference of all stakeholders, including religious and political parties and groups, particularly those representing Swat, should have been called prior to the operation. A delegation from such a conference should have been mandated to visit Swat and talk reason to the militants and report back to parliament. In other words, every effort should have been made to make the militants abide by the peace deal. All along the political effort, a concerted effort should have been made to gain time to revive civil administration, police, and the paramilitary presence in Swat.
The diehard militants who consistently refused to adhere to peace agreement could have been isolated over time – a key counter-insurgency tactic followed by precise military action to decapacitate the leadership.
Assuming, there was no alternative to the military option, then while it was being planned, arrangements should have been made for the people who were going to be displaced. Sadly, and shamefully, the military operation began suddenly under increased US pressure, timed with Zardari’s US visit and with the least concern for the people of the area.
The unfolding tragedy that is taking place in Swat is mindboggling. To flush out a few thousand militant Taliban, more than two million people have been forced to live in misery in camps not fit for animals in civilised societies. Even more disturbing is the use of heavy artillery shelling and bombing from the air alongside helicopter gunships in areas with significant civilian population. Despite a heavy blackout, the news coming from the war zone tell tales of dozens if not hundreds of innocent civilian casualties.
Given the collapse of governance in the country, can we adequately look after so many displaced people – especially as summer temperatures soar? And for how long? The wheat crop has already been lost. If the IDPs cannot return within two months, the fruit cash crops will be at risk. Hence how will they sustain themselves for the coming year? Perhaps most dangerous is the possibility of IDPs’ anger and frustration that besides resulting in riots may also swell the ranks of the militants.
In such a situation, according to the Army briefing given to the parliamentarians, there is every possibility of the Taliban resurfacing not just in Malakand Division but elsewhere in the country – possibly the urban centres. Can we afford further spread of terrorism in our cities given the precarious security and fragile economic situation? Military action breeds more militancy.
An Army action which has already led to almost 2.5 million displaced countrymen cannot simply be accepted without questions. And, as if we do not already have a crisis, Zardari has declared that the war in Swat is merely the beginning of a wider war, which is likely to engulf other parts of the country. It is time to take stock and stop ourselves from committing collective suicide. What needs to be done is the following:
* The military action unfortunately is already underway but there is no political, particularly governance, strategy which is guiding this operation. That should be the first priority so that the military action does not continue in a political vacuum.
* A clear governance and political strategy that allows the IDPs to return following a swift end to military operation is needed. This strategy should be focused on a system of speedy justice through the Nizam-e-Adl and effective civil administration. The writ of the state and the rule of law go together and this has to be ensured if violent challenges to state and government are to be avoided in the future.
* The military action, if at all, should have been extremely limited in scale and targeted with precision to minimise civilian casualties. Tragically, this did not happen and my fear is that widespread use of aerial weapons would only result in greater civilian casualties, swelling the ranks of the militants. So the military action needs to be revised to focus more on specific targeting and commando action.
Will any of this happen? Unfortunately in the present mood of the ruling elite, this does not seem likely. Instead, we will see increasing military action in the tribal areas as long as the US is in occupation of Afghanistan.
In other words, as long as US troops in Afghanistan are perceived to be an occupying force that is anti-Pushtun and anti-Islam, there will be no peace in this region. We are heading in a fatal direction unless we change our strategy and pull out of this insane war that is sinking us into chaos. The longer this persists, the deeper we will find ourselves in this quagmire and we will confront a deeply divided society.
Finally, my heart bleeds for the poor soldier confronting his own people turned into misguided and brutalised militants and giving his life for a war wrought on him by a corrupt and decadent ruling elite that cannot see beyond the lure of American dollars that have become as much of a curse for this hapless nation as the criminal extremists in our very midst.
